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1 August 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS  
No. 1572

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'RUDE PRAVO' ON 'LASTING AND TOPICAL VALIDITY' OF 1968 'WARSAW LETTER'

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 15 Jul 78 p 2 AU

[Article by Zdenek Horen: "Historical Appeal for the Defense of Socialism; 10 Years Since the 'Warsaw Letter' of the Five Fraternal Communist and Workers Parties"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /Ten years ago the vast hangar of Ruzyne Airport witnessed the impressive gathering of more than 11,000 members of the People's Militia. They did not conceal the purpose of their rally: they were filled with concern about the fate of the country, overhung by the dark clouds of counter-revolution. At that time some people were afraid of the militia, saying that they should not "provoke," and so, just to make sure, they "removed" the militia assembly to the very outskirts of Prague, to a Ruzyne hangar.....

But even from the hangar on the edge of town the voice of the People's Militia resounded powerfully enough, both throughout the country and beyond its borders: we are determined to defend the cause of socialism, and to defend it successfully. The Czechoslovak communications media, which had gradually come to be ruled by the rightwing, did not even attempt to devote any worthwhile attention to the Ruzyne rally. However, after the Soviet press had published the People's Militia's letter of greetings to the Soviet people, and after the Soviet people had begun to send their press expressions of solidarity with the Czechoslovak people, many anti-Sovietists in Czechoslovakia became nervous. Because, allegedly, the letter had informed the Soviet public incorrectly; it was even called "high treason."

What was the sin that the People's Militiamen had allegedly committed?

They declared: "We will not permit anybody, anywhere, to denigrate the principles of building socialism and communism or to aspire to jeopardize them. We disagree with, and we disassociate ourselves from, the irresponsible ways of certain journalists who, by adopting various fabricated reports from the Western press, intend to disrupt our friendship and comradeship. We will not betray the ideals for which blood was shed in the Slovak national uprising, at the Dukla Pass and the Prague barricades, ideals that were cemented in the course of our socialist construction."/

The extensive international, but naturally also domestic, reaction to the People's Militia's courageous statement of belief became, for the rightwing forces in Czechoslovakia, a pretext for attacks against the People's Militia themselves, as well as against the Soviet Union. One month later a no less furious campaign was unleashed in some of the Czechoslovak communications media against the 99 working people in the Praga plant in Prague who had expressed loyalty to socialism and to friendship with the Soviet Union in their letter to the Soviet people (on 18 July 1968).

#### Counterrevolution on the Offensive

Ten years ago a truly "hot summer" was about to begin in our country. The anticommunist and antisocialist forces were quite openly organizing demonstrations, provocations and actions that were frankly anarchistic. They were stepping up the nationalist, anti-Soviet wave. As the "Lessons" document later stated, this wave tellingly testified to the White terror that was being born. The rightwing scandalized the honest followers of socialism, sentenced them, boycotted them, discredited them, forced them to leave political life and terrorized them. The wave of social demagoguery was rising; the demands for wages increases were growing uninhibitedly. The threat of "wildcat strikes" emerged; the danger of inflation, as well as of economic disintegration, increased.

Toward the end of June 1968 a number of papers published the pamphlet "2,000 words," which became a direct instruction to take violent action and to destroy the socialist system. It was /the political platform on which the counterrevolution organized itself./ The pamphlet was seriously disquieting to every honest advocate of socialism. Moreover, it was disquieting that after it was condemned by the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium and the National Assembly, some members of the then leadership of the CPCZ voiced their support for this slanderous pamphlet. This had to give rise to serious doubts regarding the party leadership's ability to prevent the further process of disintegration.

The rightwing opportunists in the party leadership had more than once used these tactics: When the situation was suitable they agreed with this or that correct party resolution, only--later on--to do everything they could to foil it with their practical deeds. More than once they seemed to be giving in, delivering many a deceitful speech, beating their chests and saying they were faithful defenders of socialism, and hiding behind "the voice of the masses," only to put forward--on the following day--new anti-socialist demands. Not only did they not resist the emerging counterrevolution, but, on the contrary, they were consciously paving its way.

In the struggle for power they were purposefully developing they did not--as a rule--show their cards prematurely or betray their far-reaching intentions. They agreed with Eduard Goldstuecker, today's emigrant, who was most open about expressing their joint tactics. /"We would like this process to transcend the boundaries of its possibilities; we would like to keep the end open as long as possible..."/

But at home, in Prague, Goldstuecker was not as open. This he only confided to his "friends" abroad--in the Bavarian radio in March 1968.

#### International Reaction's Unconcealed Hopes

International reaction followed the developments in Czechoslovakia with unconcealed hopes. They viewed with particular sympathy the attempts to change the country's foreign policy orientation, that is, the attempts of the bloc of rightwing opportunists and counterrevolutionary forces to liquidate the alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and thus liquidate the fundamental guarantee of socialist Czechoslovakia's national and state existence.

Let us recall only some characteristic voices from the camp of international reaction in 1968... In the United States, reflections were already appearing about the strategically advantageous changes resulting from the "anticommunist coup" in Czechoslovakia. The U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT probably went the farthest in these empty hopes when it wrote that if the attempt to wrench our country from the socialist community succeeded /"Czechoslovakia would become a corridor for Western troops to directly approach the threshold of Russia"!!

The American Senate was even beginning to prepare new conditions for Czechoslovak-American relations, and on 17 May 1968 it began discussing a rapidly prepared draft bill on trade with Czechoslovakia in 1968. The American President was to be granted the right to return to Czechoslovakia the most-favored-nation clause which the United States had unilaterally withdrawn after February 1948. He also had the right to solve the question of the illegally held Czechoslovak gold. For many years the United States had put the solution of these justified Czechoslovak demands on ice, and suddenly, in 1968, it was as if Washington's conscience had awakened. But when the counterrevolution in our country failed, the United States quickly put the question of gold and the clause on ice again. It is true that in 1974 it promised to solve these questions through an intergovernmental agreement, but the reactionary forces again succeeded in sabotaging it. The year 1968 best revealed that the real interests of the United States in solving these unsolved questions of our mutual relations are not guided by the interests of international law or by historical justice but by the class interests of American imperialism.

According to the bill on trade with Czechoslovakia, the U.S. President could grant a /loan of up to \$500 million/ to Czechoslovakia in 1968. This was an obvious demagogic bait designed to encourage the forces of advancing counterrevolution.

The position of British reaction on the events in Czechoslovakia was best expressed by Mr Reginald Maudling, the then deputy leader of the Conservative Party. In the British Parliament he stated that if "Czechoslovakia were to move away from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were to disintegrate, this would be advantageous from our point of view (understand: from the point of view of British imperialism)."



The West German newspaper GENERAL ANZEIGER wrote that "the Sudeten Germans will expect Czechoslovakia, freed from communism, to return to the Munich Treaty, according to which the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany in the fall of 1938." "This is just the beginning of the road," asserted another West German daily, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, "which in Czechoslovakia inevitably must lead to a change of policy, to a turn away from Moscow."

All this evidence attested to the fact that a broad spectrum of anticommunist centers 'actively' joined in subversive actions regardless of various deceitful official statements.

#### Interests of World Socialism Endangered

In an extremely serious situation in which the counterrevolutionary threat in Czechoslovakia was steadily escalating, the Czechoslovak leadership receives from representatives of a number of fraternal parties an offer to jointly assess the development of events. Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev comes in June with a proposal for such a meeting between the two sides any-time and anywhere in Czechoslovakia or as suitable to the Czechoslovak representatives. The offer is once more repeated. Representatives of other parties also present similar offers. As it became known later, these offers usually ended in the drawer of the CPCZ Central Committee first secretary's desk, without the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium's being acquainted with them.

At the beginning of July [1968], representatives of the BCP, the MSZMP, the PZPR, the SED and the CPSU sent the CPCZ Central Committee representatives a proposal for a joint meeting in Warsaw. Our friends sincerely urged something that always was and is typical of the communist movement--comradely discussions of questions of topical interest to this movement and the cause of peace.

In the interest of complete historical truth it is necessary to say that the fraternal parties, above all the CPSU, were trying systematically and with great patience to persuade our party's leadership that the counter-revolutionary threat in the CSSR must be determinedly and actively opposed. This manifested the tremendous concern of the representatives of the fraternal parties for the fate of socialism in our country, to which no one who strives for the unity and strength of the socialist community could be or remain indifferent. In March 1968, at the meeting of representatives of six fraternal parties in Dresden, our delegation, led by A. Dubcek, is openly warned of this danger, which was clearly called the /danger of counterrevolution./ The CPCZ representatives promise the comrades of the international communist movement that they will put the house in order... Similar promises were expressed following further comradely warnings, as well as at other meetings in the first half of 1968 in Sofia and Moscow. However, the usual assurances voiced by A. Dubcek, that the CPCZ leadership, too, realizes the seriousness of the situation and that it, itself, feels the need to rectify matters, were suppressed, circumvented and not fulfilled at home. The discrepancy between

words and deeds was evident. This discrepancy objectively evoked among our friends mistrust in the statements of some of our representatives.

In this situation, when responsible Czechoslovak officials were concealing the truth about the true state of affairs, the allies could not but proceed in this manner, since they could no longer conceal their justified fears from the people in their own countries or from the people of Czechoslovakia; they could not but voice their opinion quite publicly, namely, that the counterrevolutionary development was threatening to divert the CSSR from its socialist road and that in consequence the interests of the entire socialist community were in danger.

"Or do you not see this danger, comrades? Is it really possible to remain inactive in this situation, to confine oneself to merely making declarations and assurances about loyalty to the cause of socialism and to commitments of alliance? Or do you not see that the counterrevolution is depriving you of one position after another, that the party is losing control of the development of events and increasingly retreating under the pressure of anticommunist forces?"

These words were part of the open letter sent on 15 July 1968 to the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium by the representatives of the five fraternal parties--the BCP, MSZMP, PZPR, SED and CPSU--from their 2-day meeting in Warsaw. As we know, the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium had recklessly refused to participate in this meeting, against the will of some of its members, under pressure from rightwing forces and in gross contradiction to the international traditions of our party.

#### On the Collective Security of the Countries of Socialism

The letter from Warsaw primarily expressed our friends' regret that the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium had made no use of the opportunity to collectively assess the situation that existed. That is why the participants in the meeting deemed it necessary to expound their opinion quite sincerely and frankly in this form.

"It was not, and is not, our intention," the letter states, among other things, "to interfere in matters that are purely a domestic affair of your party and your state or to violate the principles of respect for independence and equality in relations among the communist parties and socialist countries. (...)

"/At the same time we cannot agree to the hostile forces' diverting your country from the socialist road and creating the threat of Czechoslovakia's breaking away from the socialist society. This is no longer your own affair. This jointly concerns all communist and workers parties and the states bound together by alliance, cooperation and friendship. This jointly concerns our countries, rallied in the Warsaw Pact in order to secure their independence, peace and security in Europe, in order to set up an insurmountable barrier to the plotting of the imperialist forces of aggression and revanche."/

In their letter the fraternal parties' representatives analyzed in detail the international situation existing at that time, the movements and supporting forces of the counterrevolution that was underway and the positions of opportunist and revisionist elements among the CPCZ's ranks. In rereading this document today, 10 years later, we can again convince ourselves how deeply and sincerely the parties and people of the fraternal countries felt about the difficulties in our domestic political life and the danger threatening socialism in our country. They were concerned about the present, but also about the future of our nations, concerned about our wasting the price that had been paid for the victory of the socialist cause by the sacrifices of the people of Czechoslovakia. The letter expresses fraternal care and is permeated by international solidarity which is not and never has been indifferent to the fate of fellow combatants.

The letter continues: "The entire course of events in your country during the past few months shows that the forces of counterrevolution, supported by the imperialist centers, have launched a broad attack against the socialist system and have not encountered resistance by the party and people's power. There is no doubt that the centers of international imperialist reaction are involved in these events in Czechoslovakia, centers which are doing everything possible to aggravate and complicate the situation and are also encouraging antisocialist forces in this respect."

We can further read in the letter: "We are convinced that a situation has emerged in your country in which the threat to the foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia also threatens the joint vital interests of other socialist countries. /The people of our countries would never forgive us an indifferent and careless attitude in view of such a threat. (...)/ Our countries are mutually connected by treaties and agreements. These important mutual commitments of states and nations are based on the joint effort to protect socialism and to insure the socialist countries' collective security. On our parties and peoples rests the historic responsibility for not letting the accomplished revolutionary achievements be ruined.

"Each of our parties is responsible not only to its own workers class and people but also to the international workers class and the world communist movement, and it cannot evade commitments ensuing from this. We must therefore be solidary and united in defending the accomplishments of socialism, our security and the international positions of the entire socialist community./

"This is why we believe that a determined resistance to anticommunist forces and the resolute fight to maintain the socialist system in Czechoslovakia is not only your task but also ours."

The extremely serious and urgent comradely appeal to defend the socialist accomplishments in our country did not--as a result of the situation that emerged in the party's leadership--meet an adequate echo. Dubcek, Kriegel and Smrkovsky rejected it and deceitfully had their irresponsible approach hallowed by the Central Committee session on 19 July. They deceived the Central Committee by claiming that the letter was a "misunderstanding" and

that instead of "exchanging letters" it was necessary to implement a different approach--direct, mutual negotiations--first on a bilateral and later on a collective basis. But the Central Committee was not truthfully informed about the allies' previous extensive initiative to conduct negotiations, which had been concealed. Both the Central Committee and the domestic and international public was thus deceived. The intention of the rightwing opportunists was unambiguous--to gain time to complete the implementation of their plans and their betrayal of the Marxist-Leninist cause.

Our party justly considers the decision to reject the letter from the representatives of the fraternal parties to be one of the decisive mistakes committed by the CPCZ leadership in the post-January period. It added grist to the mill of those who were interested in a rupture with the allies. The rightwing opportunists in the CPCZ leadership received a reward for it in the form of stormy applause from the most inveterate counterrevolutionists.

#### The Letter's Lasting and Topical Validity

The further development of events in Czechoslovakia, the disruption which affected the very foundations of our socialist state and its entire political system, fully confirmed the correctness and timely nature of the historic Warsaw appeal.

From this logically follows our party's lasting relationship to this letter, which it appraises as a document of sincere, comradely international assistance in the most difficult moments of our history. Some people wanted to force on us the assertion that the fraternal parties were allegedly "interfering" in our internal affairs. We have unambiguously rejected such slanders. Our party was raised in the spirit of international solidarity and assistance; more than once it granted it and more than once it gratefully accepted it.

Comrade Gustav Husak said at the 15th CPCZ Congress: "Our entire historical experience demonstrates that there cannot be real patriotism without conscious-minded internationalism; that internationalists are the most consistent, devoted and real patriots. Proletarian and socialist internationalism is one of the pillars of our foreign policy and one of the sources of the firm position our country has in the world, and it is also the basis of our people's fraternal relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It is internationalism from which stems the class solidarity and the close contact of the Czechoslovak people with the revolutionary forces all over the world."

The principle, stressed in the Warsaw letter, that the defense of socialism is a joint cause of the socialist countries, which must represent--through their unity--an insurmountable barrier to the imperialist forces, has a lasting and permanently topical validity.

Real socialism is an enormous historic accomplishment of the untiring and arduous battle of the workers class and all nations for the victory of the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin. This battle against capitalism and imperialism, as well as against Hitlerite fascism, was conducted at the cost of an enormous number of victims of entire generations. The fruit of the battle--the victory of socialism in many countries--is a great historic accomplishment. The people of the socialist countries have done, are doing and will always do everything they can so that these accomplishments, the independence and security of the countries attached to our community, may never again be threatened by anyone.

The lesson drawn from these great tests obliges our party, every communist and every honest, socialist-minded citizen of our country to protect and develop socialism in our fatherland and never again to permit a threat to it by anybody, no matter what beautiful words and slogans he may hide behind.

Another basic lesson ensuing from the critical development in our party and society is that /solidarity, joint action and fraternal assistance are one of the decisive prerequisites for the success and strength of each socialist country, as well as of the entire socialist community./ Our movement's and our party's historic battles confirm the close connection between national and international interests and their mutual interdependence.

Since April 1969, when we succeeded in overcoming the critical development in party and society, our party has been consistently implementing these principles. Thanks to the faithfulness to his policy, our national economy and our people's standard of living have consolidated and continue to develop. Our close, really fraternal relations with the countries of the socialist community are developing on a broad basis, as was demonstrated by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's recent visit and by visits of other representatives of socialist countries to Czechoslovakia. We are a firm component of the world socialist community; there is an unprecedented growth in the international authority of our country.

Today after 10 years, we have every right to look back with satisfaction at the enormous amount of work our people have done under the leadership of the CPCZ for their own benefit and for the benefit of the socialist cause throughout the world.

CSO: 2400

ALBANIA

## DECLARATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEW ZEALAND ON CLASS STRUGGLE

### Declaration Published

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albania 17 Jun 78 p 4

[ATA Article: "The Communist Party of New Zealand Reaffirms Its Basic Line and Policy--Declaration of the National Committee of the Party"]

[Text] Tirana, 16 June--The newspaper PEOPLE'S VOICE, organ of the Communist Party of New Zealand, in its 22 May 1978 issue, published the Declaration of the National Committee of the Party entitled "The Communist Party Reaffirms Its Basic Line and Policy," which states:

The Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of New Zealand asserts once again its point of view that the basic conflict in New Zealand, a developed capitalist country, is the conflict between the working class and the capitalist class, led by the monopoly capital sector. As a result, the working class is faced with an absolute socialist revolution.

Any attempt to put an intermediary stage between capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat is opportunism and revisionism. The adoption of a line permitting an intermediary stage of a national-democratic, people's democratic or anti-imperialist revolution, no matter how correct it might be for many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America is nothing but class collaboration for developed New Zealand. This means collaboration with its "own" capitalist class, union with this class which is completely pro-imperialist. It means to sow among the working masses the illusion that their exploiters and class enemies are really their friends and allies who want to struggle under the leadership of the working class and its party for liberation from imperialism! All this at a time when the history of New Zealand shows that the indigenous capitalists have supported imperialism completely. Such a line in regard to New Zealand is pure bourgeois reactionary nationalism and is a complete betrayal of the fundamental interests of the working class.

This is the revisionist line which E. F. Nill and the other opportunistic leaders of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) have been attempting to impose on the party and working class of New Zealand by means of brutal Khrushchev-style interference in internal affairs and by means of intrigues and plots with a small band of indigenous anti-party conspirators, who are now being exposed.

The Communist Party of New Zealand is following a consistent line of the revolutionary class struggle in New Zealand, with the aim of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the international sphere, it is joined with the working class of the developed capitalist countries in the revolutionary struggle for socialism and against capitalism and imperialism, especially against the two imperialist superpowers, the greatest exploiters in the world, American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. It is fighting both in theory and in practice to unite the working class of New Zealand with the struggle of oppressed peoples to be liberated from imperialism and internal reactionaries. It is also struggling for the broadest unity of all peoples against the domination of the superpowers and against the race to world war.

The CP of New Zealand is developing its line in accordance with proletarian internationalism and with its practice in the revolutionary class struggle. It is carrying on a consistent struggle for complete fidelity to the basic principles of Marxism and for correct relations among sister parties, which includes non-interference in the internal affairs of other parties. We think that the solution of the problems of the revolution in each country is a matter of concern to the revolutionary workers of that country.

Under the conditions of the development of the present crisis of capitalism in New Zealand and outside the country, the imperialist bourgeoisie is attempting to destroy the CP of New Zealand because it is in the forefront of the struggle for the defense of the main interests of the working class and of the masses of the people. The imperialists are helped by a small band of petit-bourgeois elements inside the party.

Nevertheless, the ordinary members of the CP of New Zealand, together with sympathizers outside the party, have remained steadfast in their defense of the party. By acting in this manner, they defend the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. It is this resolute principled attitude which will bring about the downfall of the revisionist plots against the Communist Party of New Zealand and the further ideological, political, and organizational strengthening of the party.

Called 'Important Marxist-Leninist Document'

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 18 Jun 78 p 4

[Unsigned Article: "An Important Marxist-Leninist Document of the Communist Party of New Zealand"]

[Text] The Declaration of the National Committee of the Communist Party of New Zealand of 22 May 1978, which was published yesterday in our press and in which the party reasserts its basic line and policy, is an important Marxist-Leninist document coming at an important moment in the life of the revolutionary advancement of the proletariat of New Zealand.

In accordance with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, executed under concrete conditions in New Zealand, the Declaration asserts that today the working class of New Zealand has the mission of the socialist revolution and that the Communist Party of New Zealand is consistently carrying out the line of the revolutionary class struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Rejecting the preachings about an intermediary stage between capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, which under the conditions existing in New Zealand, a developed capitalist country, would mean the abandonment of the revolution and class collaboration with the indigenous bourgeoisie which is allied with imperialism, the National Committee of the CP of New Zealand, in its Declaration, harshly condemns these preachings as pure opportunism, revisionism, and reactionary bourgeois nationalism and as a complete betrayal of the fundamental interests of the working class.

In the international sphere, the Declaration of the National Committee of the CP of New Zealand reaffirms, at the same time, a clear Marxist-Leninist and internationalist line--the line of solidarity and unity with the revolutionary struggle of the working class of the capitalist countries for socialism against the oppressive bourgeois system of imperialism, with the struggle of oppressed peoples for liberation from imperialism and from reactionary indigenous regimes, with the struggle of the revolutionary forces of peace-loving peoples against the two greatest enemies and exploiters--American imperialism and Soviet socialimperialism--against their aims to dominate the world and against their preparations for a new world war.

The Declaration is clear proof that the CP of New Zealand persistently maintains correct, internationalist relations with the sister parties, on the basis of unshakeable fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of equality and of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of the right of each party to solve the problems of the revolution in its own country without foreign intervention and pressure, according to the universal teachings of Marxism-Leninism, its own revolutionary experience and the concrete conditions of the country.



The Albanian Workers Party and the Albanian Communists completely support these correct revolutionary Marxist-Leninist positions of the sister CP of New Zealand and strongly uphold its resolute struggle against revisionist plots which aim at the removal of the CP of New Zealand from the revolutionary road, and its degeneration and destruction. The AWP expresses its deep conviction that such plots against the sister CP of New Zealand, just as in the past, will fail in disgrace and it wishes the CP of New Zealand success in its revolutionary struggle and in the work for the further ideological, political, and organizational strengthening of the ranks of the party.

CSO: 2100

BIGGEST PROBLEMS OF CSSR CAPITALS EXAMINED

Prague: Transportation

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 24, 14 Jun 78 p 3

[Interview with Jindrich Skubal, deputy mayor of Prague, by Jaroslav Kojzar]

[Text] Prague's transportation system is a problem. The long minutes of waiting at Bohnice, Malesice, and Novodvorska are giving rise to well warranted criticism. A drive across town takes hours, and this places drivers under a great deal of stress. What is to be done about this? When will things get better?

[Question] Comrade deputy mayor, you know the questions....

[Answer] What is to be done? First of all, we have had to think about making up for past neglect. That is, throughout the prewar no one was interested in doing anything about Prague's transportation system. Talk about building the metro or the bridge across Nusle valley went on for years, but no final decisions were ever made. In the meantime other cities around the world were looking for ways to cope with the future growth in demand for transportation services. But here in Prague? We just kept on filling potholes. After the war there was more important work to be done. Nor should we forget about the cold war and the need to focus our attention on the development of those economic branches that made it possible for us to achieve economic independence. It was not until the 1960's and especially not until the 1970's that we had a chance to think about how to deal with the multiplying ills in the transportation sector.

[Question] When will things get better?

[Answer] Things are already getting better. It is enough to mention the completion of the metro "C" line, and in August the "A" line will open. In October we want to start work on the construction of a new road connection running from the Vinohrady area all the way to the northern section

of Hlavkovy Most. In 1980 and 1981 a heavy-use road will be built to extend this connection to Barikadniky Bridge, V Holesovickach Street, through a complicated multilevel interchange near Vychovatelna, to the highway leading out of Prague toward Liberec. However, a great many more problems will remain, and these problems can be overcome only through a great deal of long, hard work. The plans that have been drawn up for this work are firmly entrenched in our master transportation plan.

[Question] Let's talk about some of these trouble spots....

[Answer] Let's start, then, with the Master Transportation Plan for the capital city of Prague, which represents the long-range program for the reconstruction and construction of the transportation system that we are now in the process of carrying out.

[Question] What part of this master plan is receiving the most attention?

[Answer] In terms of capital expenditure most of our attention is focused on the construction of the Metro, the basic road system, the reconstruction of the railroad junction network, and a number of other transportation-related construction projects. Let us look at a few statistics in order to get a better idea of the scope of all this activity. During the Fifth Five-Year Plan we spent Kcs 5.78 billion korunas on these tasks. During the course of the present Sixth Five-Year Plan we have already spent Kcs 10,614,000,000, and during the Seventh Five-Year Plan we expect to spend around 13.5 billion....

[Question] But this is after all not just a question of rebuilding the existing network. Rather we are also concerned with producing more advanced transportation vehicles and building up the system's technical infrastructure. Will there not be some changes in this area too?

[Answer] Yes, certainly. And these proposed changes are just as important. We are making plans for the acquisition of new rolling stock both in the urban mass transit sector and in the public freight traffic sector.

[Question] How many people used urban mass transit vehicles last year?

[Answer] Our total ridership came to more than 1 billion.

[Question] That is quite a respectable figure. But it is hard for the average public transportation user to judge whether this figure is big or small....

[Answer] For the sake of comparison I will cite a few examples of ridership statistics from some other European cities. Budapest, covering an area of 525 square kilometers, has a population of nearly 2 million people, and the annual ridership in this city comes to 1.46 billion passengers.

Brussels has a population of 1.3 million and covers an area of 162 square kilometers. In one year 219 million passengers are carried by this city's public transportation system. In Warsaw, with a population of 1.4 million, the public transportation system serves an annual ridership of 1,095,000,000 passengers. And in Prague? I have already quoted the annual ridership statistic for our city. Our metropolitan area has a population of 1,167,000 living in a total area of 297 square kilometers, taking into account the densely populated sections of the city. What is more, in Prague there are 5.16 kilometers of urban mass transit lines per square kilometer, whereas in Brussels the same figure is 2.38 kilometers and Budapest 4.82 kilometers. Thus, the density of our urban mass transit system is comparable to that of foreign capitals. Prague is decidedly not an underdeveloped city in this regard.

[Question] The Metro is the principal factor contributing to the growth of our urban mass transit system. How are things going with the construction of the Metro?

[Answer] It should be realized that for a long time to come streetcars and buses will continue to account for a large share of the traffic load of our urban mass transit system. But, under the watchful eyes of our party and state organs, work on the construction of the Metro is moving along at a good pace. And we would be glad if work on other construction projects was moving along at the same pace. We have succeeded every year in surpassing the targets that have been set for metro construction work. Much of the credit for this belongs to our Soviet comrades, mainly to our friends from Moscow. Our Metro construction project has its share of heroes too, heroes whose names will always be fondly remembered by the citizens of Prague, including, just to mention a few, the Mikulas Livak Heroes of Socialist Labor Brigade from the Military Construction Corps, the socialist labor brigades led by the construction foremen Hromada, Ulehly, and Kralik from the METROSTAV enterprise and Kladno Mine Construction Enterprise, and so on.

[Question] When will the new Metro lines go into service?

[Answer] Just as the first operational section of the Metro "C" line was put into service ahead of schedule on 9 May 1974, in response to an appeal from the CPCZ Municipal Committee for Prague steps are being taken, backed up by a socialist pledge made by all those taking part in the construction project, to open the "1 A" line on a trial-run basis by 1 July 1978 and on a permanent, full-service basis by the middle of August 1978. In order to meet this deadline we also have to make extensive changes in the routing of electric streetcar lines and bus lines.

[Question] What about the other sections of the Metro system?

[Answer] We will put the lines "2 C" (Kacerov-Jizni Mesto) and "2 A" (Namesti Miru - Zelivskeho) into service in 1980, which means that we will

have fulfilled the resolutions of the CPCZ 15th Congress and that by this time 20 kilometers of metro lines will be in service. With regard to the construction of the "1 B" line (from Sokolovska to the Prague-Smichov railway station), work got under way last year ahead of schedule on this project. This year we will also start work, again ahead of schedule, on the construction of the "3 C" line running between Sokolovska and Vrbensky.

[Question] How are things going with the reconstruction of the main road system?

[Answer] During 1977, working in accordance with the work schedule plan for the completion of individual sections of the road system, we succeeded in meeting the city's needs with respect to its link-up with the main highway and road network. Last year's tasks were fulfilled by 102.8 percent, and deadlines were also met with respect to preliminary and final surveying preparations. As a result, we will be able to start work this year on the construction of the Barrandov Bridge, which when it is completed will make it possible to link both banks of the Vltava in the city's southern section and lay the basic groundwork for moving ahead at full speed with work on the construction of new housing projects in southwest Prague. Work is also proceeding successfully on the reconstruction of the northern approach to Hlavkovy Bridge and the multilevel Vychovatelna interchange. Work on the construction of an overpass over the Central Prague railway station and on other projects is more or less finished.

All of this reconstruction work has made our lives more complicated, but it has not compromised progress on new road construction work. But we have had to build new roads to carry truck traffic so that coal from the North Bohemian coal basin could be delivered promptly to Prague. In the past much of this coal was shipped by water. However, this turned out to be an unusually complex task, if only for the reason that there has been a persistent shortage of manpower and spare parts for trucks. But by the beginning of summer the effects of equipment breakdowns will have been cleared up, and we will be shipping coal and structural substrates by ship on the same scale as before.

[Question] Of course, it is not only difficulties of this kind that are causing problems. There are also those kinds of difficulties which, one might say, are foreseeable. Is this not so?

[Answer] If you are thinking about the increase in the number of passenger autos in Prague, then, yes, this is the case. Here are a few statistics to give you a better idea as to the scope of this problem. In 1970 there were 190,000 registered passenger autos in Prague. As of 31 December of last year this number had increased to 233,000. And to this number you have to add on another 100,000 or so trucks. What is the result of all this? Namely, that the increased use of passenger autos as a means of commuting to and from work, in addition to generating more exhaust emissions

and noise, which do serious damage to the living environment, especially along certain roadways, is causing a number of problems, especially in terms of its impact on urban mass transit services, which take up 20 times less space than private auto traffic. You yourself are surely familiar with how private auto traffic slows down the movement of streetcars and buses in the city center. Last year we calculated that 300,000 vehicles drive through the city center every day. Consequently, in order to deal with this problem we have to gear our efforts not only toward new capital spending, but also toward finding answers right now to certain problems associated with the traffic control systems. I can cite one specific example in connection with the closure of Divadelni Street and certain other of our city streets, which carry traffic into the city center from the east and southeast sides. This street closure, mainly during the first few days after it went into effect, was not very well received by passenger car drivers, but they soon got used to it and understood why it was necessary. Thousands of drivers started to leave their cars at home. And the result? The speed of streetcar and bus traffic passing through the city center increased sharply, so that today this traffic is moving through the city center at an average speed of 15-18 kilometers per hour. I should add that nearly nine out of every ten people commute to and from work on urban mass transit vehicles.

[Question] But what is next on the agenda?

[Answer] In the future as well we must continue to take steps aimed at giving preference to urban mass transit ahead of other kinds of urban transportation. We must give a clear preference to streetcars and buses ahead of private transportation everywhere in Prague, but above all in the overcrowded core area, make arrangements for night deliveries, and take certain other regulatory measures, such as prohibiting vehicular traffic on certain streets, turning other streets into one-way streets, clearing up parking problems, and so on. The great majority of our citizens understand the need for these measures, as is being demonstrated by the public hearings on transportation problems which are now being held in all citizen's committees.

[Question] Are you having any manpower problems?

[Answer] Yes. And these problems often reach emergency proportions. For example, the significant shortage of streetcar and bus drivers is placing a heavy burden on the operation of the whole transportation system, and things are reaching the point where, against our wishes, we are being forced to prolong waiting periods at streetcar and bus stops by reducing the frequency of service. To deal with this problem transportation workers are putting in more overtime than in almost any other sector of the national economy. Moreover, a large number of retirees from the ranks of former transportation enterprise employees are having to report to work every day. Without their services things would be a lot worse.

[Question] Does not this state of affairs give rise to situations in which transportation workers, being aware of their indispensability, behave irresponsibly?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, conflicts with riders can and do occur. The Prague National Committee has received a number of specific complaints along these lines. For this reason too, the question of the ethics, politeness, and the behavior of drivers and transportation employees in general was one of the top items on the agenda of this year's communist party member conferences held in the Electric Rail and Streetcar Enterprises of our city's transportation enterprises concern. The delegates attending these conferences endorsed the demand stating that, notwithstanding the manpower shortage, misbehavior should not be tolerated and that the strictest possible disciplinary measures should be applied against all violators. The promotion of competition drives, e.g., the competition for the title "Model Quality Transportation Line" and so on, also has an important role to play in this regard.

[Question] What can be done to stabilize worker turnover?

[Answer] Some of the concrete steps we plan to take to achieve this goal include providing housing to transportation workers, medical and social welfare benefits, and other measures. But these measures will also be complemented by worker education programs. But, anyway, have not we already said enough? Come back in a year, and we will review our performance to see how good a job we did in fulfilling some of our goals.

[Question] Thank you for granting us this interview.

Bratislava: Unfinished Construction Projects

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 19 Jun 78 p 3

[Article by Gustav Capko: "The Growing City on the Danube"]

[Text] During the present decade Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia with a current population of 360,000 citizens, has been growing at an unprecedentedly rapid rate. This is also due to the fact that the directives for the further economic and social development of our society, endorsed by the 15th Congress of the CPCZ, have created unprecedented opportunities for this city's all-round growth and, in particular, for an intensive program of capital construction.

Bratislava's growth since the 14th Congress of the CPCZ has been characterized by a high rate of growth in capital construction activity. The volume of capital construction slated for this Five-Year Plan is nearly three times higher than what it was during the Fourth Five-Year Plan and 60 percent greater than what it was during the preceding Five-Year Plan. The completion

of comprehensive housing construction projects also accounts for a significant share of the overall volume of capital construction. The fast pace of this housing construction activity is also documented by the number of newly built housing units. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan 15,159 new housing units were built, and during the Fifth Five-Year Plan another 24,531 new housing units were built. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan the state plan calls for the construction of 27,300 new housing units in the city on the Danube.

Even though Bratislava has never before experienced such a rapid upsurge in housing construction, the drafting and implementation of the city's capital development plans, with special emphasis on comprehensive housing construction, especially on the Petržalka section of the city, come in for the most frequent criticism in the offices of the party's municipal committee. As was pointed out at the recent Bratislava party conference by the first secretary of the CPSL municipal committee, Gejza Slapka, "This is not because too little has been accomplished in this area, since, after all, the number of housing units built since 1945 alone comes close to the 90,000 mark. And more than 70 percent of Bratislava's population lives in this new housing. What we are criticizing, rather, is the quality and comprehensiveness of housing project construction work and the fact that work on the construction of our housing complexes often remains unfinished in terms of their infrastructural requirements and, not infrequently, even in terms of basic public services. These housing complexes suffer from a lack of movie theaters, shops, sports facilities, cultural and social centers, and employment opportunities. Our city is very vulnerable when it comes to interruptions in the supply of thermal energy, water, and electric power, and the capacity of our road transportation system is no longer able to keep up with our present needs.

"There continues to be a large number of trouble spots and shortcomings in the drafting and implementation of our capital development goals and plans. Most of these problems are attributable to our own personal shortcomings, i.e., the shortcomings of individual people, shortcomings in the quality of their work, their ability to look ahead, their personal activism and commitment, their ability and willingness to prepare programs in a planned manner and to follow through on them until they are fully implemented in a prompt and persevering manner."

The truthfulness of this statement is also corroborated by the results that have been achieved during the first 5 months of this year's work on the comprehensive housing construction plan. During this period the Bratislava Building Construction Enterprise finished work on 842 housing units, and of this number 192 were built for municipal housing authorities, 370 for housing cooperatives, and 280 for enterprises. However, in relation to the total annual housing construction target of 4,784 housing units only 31.1 percent of this target was fulfilled for enterprise-sponsored housing, 17.8 percent for cooperative-sponsored housing, and only 10.6 percent for municipally sponsored housing. And this is really a poor showing! According to a binding pledge made by the management officials of the Building



Construction general directorate and the main coordinator of housing construction activity--the Bratislava Building Construction Enterprise--1,864 housing units were supposed to be ready for occupancy in Bratislava by the end of the first 6 months of this year, including 1,022 housing units during June alone. This is a relatively ambitious but, if a greater effort were made by all interested parties, realistic task. But in spite of all this the question arises as to whether we should be satisfied with this performance record, since this performance accounts for only 38.9 percent of annual target, i.e., it is 3.1 percent lower than the performance indicator called for by the government resolution. Consequently, as was the case in 1977, the focal point of all our work is being shifted to the second half of this year. Does this not mean that we will witness a rerun of the situation that developed last year when in November and December construction workers had to make an all-out crash effort to finish 2,000 housing units?

Even worse results were achieved in the area of public services construction. During the first 5 months of this year public services construction workers were supposed to have finished ten installation jobs at seven different construction sites, but in fact only one job was completed--a services facility in Lamac, which was finished 5 months ahead of schedule by the Banska Bystrica Building Construction Enterprise. The longest delays have occurred with respect to facilities under construction by the Bratislava Building Construction Enterprise. For example, some of these overdue facilities include two kindergartens with spaces for 240 children in Petržalka-Zrcadlovy Haj II and in Osviste, which were supposed to have been finished in March, two children's day-care centers for 140 children in Zrcadlovy Haj II, of which one was supposed to have been ready in February and the other in April, and two service facilities in the same locality and another service facility and retail trade outlet in Zrcadlovy Haj I. Thus, these are all facilities which are strongly missed in these housing projects.

Work is also lagging way behind in the area of technical services. Out of the 63 projects, which according to the agreed upon construction timetable were supposed to have been completed during this period, only 20 were in fact finished.

Once again it is being borne out that ambitious tasks--as was pointed out at the 15th Congress of the CPCZ and the 11th session of the party's Central Committee--can only be fulfilled by means of a substantial upgrading in the quality of management work. This is just as true in the case of the efforts that are being made to carry out Bratislava's capital construction program. The importance of capital development to any city's growth, its extensive and long-range nature, and the vital necessity of making sure that the funds allocated from the national income for capital construction purposes are spent in an efficient manner undoubtedly require that management workers, party members, and party officials at all levels of management in this and in related fields should take a more responsible and more active approach to the fulfillment of their assigned tasks. A more flexible approach to

to the implementation of the resolutions drawn up by the 11th session of the CPCZ Central Committee on the subject of urban development would also most certainly be helpful in promoting the more effective resolution of the serious problems which have to be dealt with in the course of meeting this city's comprehensive housing construction needs. In accordance with these resolutions the responsible officials of the National Committee of the capital city of the SSR and also the responsible officials of the local construction industry, most particularly those in the Building Construction Industry general directorate and the Bratislava Building Construction Enterprise and other interested parties, are directed to speed up the development of construction capacities and the adaptation of their structure to the city's needs, to build up a sufficiently large and technically advanced building materials manufacturing infrastructure, to improve the quality and comprehensiveness of work related to the construction of housing projects, and also to fulfill plan requirements calling for the transfer of construction capacities to Bratislava. These officials intend to take a stricter approach than heretofore to the task of reviewing compliance with planned deadlines for the drafting and approval of design tasks and preliminary designs, the level and quality of preparatory work on predesign blueprints by investors and on final design blueprints by STAVOPROJEKT, and also the timely completion of legal arrangements to prepare building sites for construction work and their transferral to building contractors within prescribed deadlines. They also want to do a more thorough job of reviewing building projects while actual construction work is under way, especially in terms of their rapid groundbreaking, the evenly scheduled completion of construction work, the quality of construction work, adherence to financial and technological discipline, the comprehensiveness of finished work on buildings and building complexes, and compliance with deadlines for the completion and opening of building projects. Things would improve if these intentions were quickly carried out in practice and if the material incentive bonuses paid to workers responsible for the technical supervision of building projects were tied to the attainment of better work quality performance records, to the more evenly scheduled fulfillment of tasks, and to compliance with prescribed construction deadlines.

The fulfillment of this year's tasks with respect to the inauguration and completion of housing construction work and furnishing of comprehensive public and technical services in Bratislava will be aided by the recently signed joint socialist pledge made by all partners involved in the fulfillment of these tasks. These partners resolved that they would completely fulfill all tasks associated with this year's comprehensive housing construction plan in Bratislava. For example, the workers of the "Dukla" Ceskomoravska Kolben Danek plant in Prague resolved that they would give top priority to the installation of three boiler plants so that they would be ready during the forthcoming winter to supply heat to new apartment buildings. The construction workers of the Bratislava Building Construction Enterprise intend to fulfill their tasks through the more widespread application of the continuous and Zlobin methods so that by the end of this year

10 percent of all main construction teams would be working in accordance with the Zlobin method and 80 percent in accordance with the continuous operation method. Steps are being taken to make sure that the Petrzalka and Varkun prefab panel plants will be able to supply the necessary volume of high-quality prefab panels. The setting of these goals and the dedicated approach that is being taken by other concerned partners to the fulfillment of current tasks and to the resolution of problems in the area of comprehensive housing construction in Bratislava can only be applauded. But their performance during the final 6 months of this year will undoubtedly demonstrate the extent to which they were successful in turning their words into deeds.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### CZECHOSLOVAK INVENTIONS, DISCOVERIES SURVEYED

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[Article by Eng Miroslav Belohlavek, chairman of the Office for Inventions and Discoveries]

[Text] Of extraordinary importance to the formation of the socialist movement of inventors, improvers, and innovators were the ideas set forth in a letter written by comrade Klement Gottwald to the First National Conference of Working Youth held in October 1948: "...to insure the auspicious development of our construction efforts and to insure the success of the Five-Year Plan it is essential that we should encourage the lateral growth of the Libcice Movement to the point where it encompasses all plants and all working class youth, and not only young people, but rather all industrial workers and professional employees. Secondly, it is also necessary to promote the growth of the Libcice Movement in terms of the depth of its impact. This means that it must not only fight for the eradication of stumbling blocks that hinder us in our work, but also search for new working methods, methods that are more profitable and more economical. We call this the struggle for higher labor productivity, and this is our principal task as we stand on the threshold of the Five-Year Plan. There can be no doubt but that a wide range of opportunities is opening up in this area for young people in particular, for the application of their drive, ingenuity, inventiveness, and for what is simply referred to in the vernacular as 'savvy.' The experiences of the Soviet working people show that in this field everyone can be an inventor, literally everyone who enjoys their work and their profession, who puts their heart into their work, and who keeps their wits about them."

During the 30 years that have passed since the Victory of February 1948 the working class and the scientific and technical intelligentsia in the CSSR have produced more than 150,000 new technical designs that qualify as inventions. During this same period more than 75,000 inventors' certificates and patents were issued. And during the same period also 4,800,000 product improvement applications were submitted. More than 45,000 inventions and in excess of 2,500,000 product improvement suggestions were put to practical

use in the national economy. The economic contribution to the national economy resulting from the harnessing of these inventions and product improvement suggestions during this period is equivalent to 126 billion korunas.

The names and feats of the heroes of our five-year plans, who were present at the creation of the socialist inventors, improvers, and innovators movement, and of those who followed their example are well-known. To cite a few examples we might mention Vaclav Adam, Frantisek Hamr, Karel Kyzlink, Josef Vohnicky, and Frantisek Zyka in the field of machine tool and machine building technology; Vaclav Rohlena and Viera Trlandova in the field of textile machinery and technology; Vendelin Macho, Vaclav Fiala, Jiri Mostecky, Josef Rubas, and thousands of others. These are, in the true sense of the word, heroes of our time and leaders of their country, people for whom creative work was synonymous with the purpose of life.

With respect to inventions and product improvement suggestions there was a steep decline in the level of technical creative initiative during the crisis years 1968-1969. For example, in 1969 only 5,236 Czechoslovak applications were filed for invention patents. At the turn of 1968-1969 a mere 87,266 product improvement suggestions were submitted, which amounts to approximately one-fourth of the number that was submitted in 1961. A similar situation also developed with respect to the harnessing of inventions and product improvement suggestions in industry.

The slowdown and decline in the flow of inventions and product improvement suggestions were caused by the rightist revisionist concepts which violated the basic Leninist principles of the planned management of invention and product improvement activity and which deeply underestimated and diminished the role of the masses.

Under the leadership of the CPCZ the Leninist principles calling for the planned management of invention and product improvement activity were restored during the course of the Fifth Five-Year Plan. After the 14th and 15th congresses of the CPCZ inventors and product improvement developers were presented with a clear program and a specific course of action that would remain in effect through the year 1980. And the results of their efforts were soon in evidence. During 1977 6,983 new technical designs were produced by Czechoslovak designers that qualified as applications for invention patents, which is 1,710 more than were produced during the crisis years 1968-1969 and 6.1 percent more than were produced during 1976. During 1976 263,685 new technical designs were produced and submitted as product improvement applications. Compared to the period 1968-1969, this amounted to an increase of more than 175,000 product improvement applications. During 1976 work also began on the practical utilization of 2,200 inventions and 130,432 product improvement suggestions. The annual economic benefits to society as a result of the harnessing of these inventions and product improvement suggestions have already passed the Kcs 6 billion mark.

The newly harnessed inventions and product improvement suggestions in the industrial, research, design, and construction fields during the Fifth Five-Year Plan contributed to the development of more than 1,000 new machines and 400 technologies and helped to fulfill production plan targets, to reduce net production costs, to conserve more fuels, energy and raw materials, and to increase labor productivity and work safety. To cite a few examples one might mention the series of newly invented equipment and technologies that were used to enhance the efficiency of oil refining, especially in terms of the production of new materials, the unique CONTIS textile machinery and technology, the BD-200, the METAP system, new equipment and techniques for the production of halogen lamps, equipment and technology used for the preservation of animal fodders, and so on.

On a worldwide rating scale the CSSR occupies sixth place with 44.4 invention patent applications per 1,000 citizens and eighth place in terms of the total number of invention patent applications. In terms of the development of new technical designs that can qualify for invention patent applications the CSSR has achieved a record of 0.87 applications for every 1,000 workers. In the scientific research infrastructure 4.1 new technical designs qualifying for invention patent applications were submitted for every 100 scientists and technicians. However, many scientific research institutes are submitting more than 20 such applications for every 100 of their employees.

With regard to the creative work of product improvement developers, 41.7 new technical designs qualifying as product improvement suggestions were produced for every 1,000 workers. For example, at the Klement Gottwald Iron and Engineering Works in Vitkovice one out of every four workers has a record as a product improvement developer (27 product improvement suggestions per 100 workers).

When viewed from the standpoint of the qualitative requirements of the Sixth Five-Year Plan and the resolutions of the various sessions of the CPCZ Central Committee the rate of growth and the absolute number of inventions and product improvement suggestions are still not commensurate with the capabilities and needs of the Czechoslovak national economy, primarily in terms of the need to increase the efficiency and quality of our products. Great discrepancies and untapped resources exist within individual ministries, enterprises, institutes, and regions in terms of the development and harnessing of inventions and product improvement suggestions. Our national economy has the potential for further growth, consisting in the advancement of education, worker skills, and the ratio of fixed capital stock per worker and in the setting of higher plan targets.

Law No 84/1972 SBIRKA ZAKONU on Discoveries, Inventions, Product Improvement Suggestions, and Industrial Prototypes is based on the Leninist principle of the certification of inventors' rights. Inventions and product improvement suggestions are socialist property. This law represents one of several of the qualitative measures that have been adopted with a view to the

implementation of CPCZ policy in the area of scientific and technological development and the promotion of worker initiative.

In the arena of the struggle between the new and the old this law specifically defines the functions and responsibilities of organs, organizations, and individuals. However, investigations of the compliance with and the application of this law in various organs and organizations reveal that there are still organs and organizations in which the rights and duties set forth under the terms of this law are being misinterpreted, and this is essentially to the detriment of the socialist state, inventors, and the organizations themselves. This law applies to everyone, and all excuses and explanations as to why it is not being carried out are groundless.

In accordance with the needs of the economy and in compliance with the law it is necessary to act responsibly, skillfully, and promptly in making technical and economic decisions that determine when, where, and how all new designs will be put to practical use. Wherever the deadlines and duties set forth by the law are not complied with the creative initiative of entire work collectives is undermined and development-use cycles are prolonged.

This law was also established orderly guidelines that are to regulate the awarding of bonuses for inventions and product improvement suggestions. Improperly designated bonus amounts and, in particular, unwarranted delays in meeting deadlines for the disbursement of bonuses are anti-social acts which are detrimental to the initiative of inventors and to the national economy. During 1976 Kcs 261.8 million were paid out to inventors and product improvement developers in the form of bonuses. This amounts to a 156.4 percent increase over bonus payments made in 1971. Before the passage of the new law the average bonus paid for the practical application of new inventions amounted to Kcs 11,200, while the average bonus for product improvement suggestions amounted to Kcs 1,050. But by 1976 these bonus amounts jumped to Kcs 16,588 for inventions and to Kcs 1,807 for product improvement suggestions.

Czechoslovak inventors and product improvement developers have a clear and specific program for the Sixth Five-Year Plan that is based on the needs of the national economy and the creative potential of the working people. On the basis of resolution No 296/1975 of the government of the CSSR central organs, enterprises, and scientific research institutes have developed programs for the further advancement of the development and practical application of inventions, product improvement suggestions, and industrial prototypes with a view to the fulfillment of scientific and technological development and production tasks during the course of the Sixth Five-Year Plan.

These programs are primarily geared toward seeing to it that the state science and technology plan, the comprehensive socialist rationalization programs, the innovation programs, current production tasks and their ancillary ad hoc tasks aimed at the resolution of key problems constitute the point of

departure for channeling the creative efforts of industrial workers, co-operative farmers, and the scientific and technical intelligentsia. This is making it possible to focus on the current most urgent needs of the national economy and to speed up the development, evaluation, testing, and practical application of inventions and product improvement suggestions in industry.

The programs that are dedicated to increasing the contribution of inventions and product improvement suggestions to scientific and technological development and economic growth also make provisions for the greater participation of the working class and the scientific and technical intelligentsia in the process of scientific and technological development.

We must see to it that the volume of new technical designs that qualify as inventions increases by at least from 2 to 2.5 percent annually, accompanied by a corresponding increase of from 5 to 6 percent per annum in the volume of product improvement suggestions. During the final year of the Sixth Five-Year Plan we must achieve a record of at least 7,100 Czechoslovak invention patent applications and 340,000 product improvement applications. The economic benefits to society resulting from the practical application of inventions and product improvement suggestions must increase annually by 6-7 percent, and by 1980 the practical application of these achievements should result in an annual social profit of Kcs 7.1 billion.

In line with the Directives for the Economic and Social Development of the CSSR During the Period 1976-1980 it is necessary that in our management of the process of scientific and technological development we should make more consistent use of the inventions and discoveries criterion as one of the indicators used to describe the world-class up-to-dateness and progressiveness of techniques and technologies. It is mandatory that this criterion must be taken into account when evaluating the work of scientific research organizations, when approving new products and technologies and setting their prices, when evaluating the performance of creative work collectives and individual workers, and also when defending master's and doctoral dissertations.

In the course of carrying out this program it is essential that, in line with the resolutions of the 15th Congress of the CPCZ, we should further strengthen the mutual collaboration of governmental and economic organs with social organizations, in particular through the forums of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, the Socialist Youth Union, and the Czechoslovak Scientific and Technical Society. We must also take advantage of the support given by the Ninth All-Trade Unions Congress to the program for the advancement of the development and practical application of inventions and product improvement suggestions with a view to the fulfillment of scientific and technical development tasks and production tasks during the course of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. We must lay the groundwork for the further progress of this drive so that during the Sixth Five-Year Plan we can realize a social profit of at least Kcs 30 billion resulting from the harnessing of inventions and product improvement suggestions. As examples of the efforts that are being made in this direction one might mention the work that has been accomplished by the miners of the Ostrava-Karvina Coal Basin, the machine building workers of the Martin Heavy Machinery Plants, the metallurgical workers of Vitkovice, the workers of the "29 August Plants" in Partizanske, and many others.



## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### SSR SCHOOL OFFICIALS DISCUSS SLOVAK EDUCATION

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 14 Jun 78 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Slovak School Administrators Confer Prior to the End of the School Year; Increasing the Efficiency of the School System"]

[Text] Banska Bystrica--It has already become an established tradition that every year before the close of the school year administrators from all of Slovakia's krajs and okreses meet in order to evaluate the events and achievements of the waning school year and the progress that was made toward the fulfillment of the tasks assigned by the Plan for the Improvement of Our School System and in order to familiarize themselves with the main tasks that will attend preparations for the next school year. This was the goal and the agenda of the all-Slovakia conference of school administrators which was held yesterday in Bansk Bystrica with the participation of the chief of the Education and Sciences Department of the CPSL Central Committee, I. Litvaj, the minister of education of the SSR, Eng J. Busa, and his deputy ministers, the secretary of the Central Slovakia Kraj Committee of the CPSL, A. Podolca, the vice chairman of kraj and okres national committees, the education commission chairmen and the education department heads of the kraj and okres national committees, and other officials.

In his keynote address the minister of education of the SSR, J. Busa, based his remarks on the resolutions of the recent 11th session of the CPCZ Central Committee and the March session of the CPSL Central Committee, which as they apply to the educational field assign top priority to enhancing work quality and efficiency and to raising the level and effectiveness of political-organizational, administrative, and control work, i.e., through the application of strict performance evaluation criteria, the curtailment of bureaucratic methods, the strengthening of personal contacts, and the eradication of routinism. Further, it is necessary to eliminate discrepancies in work efficiency and quality among individual okreses and krajs and among individual schools and educational institutions and to be more economical in the expenditure of public resources and funds allocated for the advancement and needs of education.

The school year which will soon come to an end was characterized by the achievement of further positive results in terms of shaping the ideological and political consciousness and reinforcing the scientific world view of young people. In this connection, however, minister Busa pointed out the formalistic teaching methods which have still not been completely eradicated and which are manifested in the isolation of upbringing work from the subject instruction process and in the inadequate linkage of upbringing issues with the political and social problems confronting our entire society. The minister praised the interest of teachers in the experimental verification of the new concept of pre-school education in multiple-class kindergartens as a good starting point for the large-scale application of this concept during the next school year and their mastery of newly devised teaching methods in the first and second grades of elementary schools. In spite of these decidedly positive achievements, elementary school teachers failed to do a complete job of laying a suitable groundwork that would be conducive to the fulfillment of vocational and polytechnical education tasks to the extent that was required. The vocational training of pupils is lagging behind, and cooperation between schools and industrial and agricultural enterprises has been stepped up only slightly. Many schools are lacking industrial arts shops, and those that do exist are poorly equipped. An energetic effort needs to be made to make a start at overcoming these deficiencies. Nor has enough progress been made toward bringing the vocational interests of young people into harmony with the needs of the national economy, especially with respect to the placement of 8th grade pupils from basic 9-year schools in worker training institutions. During the current school year only 1,400 pupils graduating from elementary schools--or 76.6 percent of the planned number--were admitted into 4-year apprentice trade schools, and problems have also arisen in connection with the placement of 8th grade pupils in the new 3-year apprentice trade schools. Plan targets were achieved with respect to 9th grade pupils.

Minister Busa went on to discuss the advanced training of teachers and other educational personnel. A proper effort is being made to train teachers to teach 3rd and 4th grade classes in elementary schools in accordance with new basic teaching methods, and work is also proceeding well with the periodic retraining of administrative pedagogical officials in special courses, which were attended this year by 322 kindergarten principals and 798 principals and vice principals of basic 9-year schools. Programs for especially gifted pupils have produced encouraging results by increasing the number of pupils attending schools or participating in classes with expanded curricula in mathematics and languages, attending elementary art schools, and participating in special olympics to test their knowledge of mathematics, physics, and chemistry. But at the same time it must be stated that on a kraj-to-kraj basis pupils are unevenly represented in schools with expanded advanced language curricula. Out of a total of 13,492 pupils with exceptional language aptitudes 5,235 are taking advanced courses in Bratislava's basic 9-year school system, while only 2,043 are taking such courses in all of the Central Slovakia Kraj. Further, we should address ourselves to the problem of what

to do about the overloading of our young people with school work, one cause of which is the large number of our present, over-voluminous textbooks. The overworking of our pupils is also attributable to the mechanical assignment of homework to pupils, the setting up of course schedules in some schools that emphasize the personal interests of the teaching staff, and frequent interruptions of classroom routines.

An effort has gotten under way to come up with specific solutions to problems associated with advancing the training of the teaching staff of apprentice schools, and another urgent task has to do with the need to lay the best possible material and technical groundwork for the newly established junior vocational training colleges and to systematically build them up. Within the context of a general curriculum revision process the scope of basic vocational training in general secondary schools is also being expanded, and to this end it is also necessary to do a more effective job of meeting classroom space and materials needs. During the current school year a new curriculum concept was tested in secondary trade schools in six basic subject areas--at selected schools.

At the conclusion of his speech minister Busa discussed the main tasks that await us during the next school year, i.e., the reinforcement of communist upbringing, the better inculcation of good work habits, the upgrading of vocational and polytechnical training of children and young people, devoting increased attention to meeting the general needs of the newly established junior vocational training colleges, strengthening teacher training programs, and doing a more effective job of administering and reviewing the performance of the entire educational system.

The conference participants were also addressed by the head of the Department of Education and Sciences of the CPSL Central Committee, I. Litvaj, who above all stressed the need for the uniformity of upbringing and teaching methods and for the reflection of ideological and scientific principles in school subject matters. At the same time, young people must not be treated as mere passive objects of the instructional process who do nothing but memorize the facts explained by teachers, rather they must be treated as the active subjects of the process of upbringing and education and as co-participants in activities dedicated to the attainment of a specified educational goal. In particular, he praised those teachers whose specialized and pedagogical skills form an integral part of their socialist consciousness and who succeed in inspiring young people to dedicate themselves to the ideals of communism and in arming them with the knowledge and skills they will need later in life. Comrade Litvaj praised the results that have so far been achieved in the implementation of the Plan for the Improvement of the System of Upbringing and Education, and he pointed out several concrete problems to which we will have to devote our special attention.

Comrade Litvaj's speech was followed by a general debate in which the participants in the all-Slovakia conference, on the basis of the specific facts and information reported by representatives of various okreses, towns and obeces, expressed their views on the issues at hand and familiarized themselves with the substance of the preparations that are being made to fulfill the tasks of the next school year.

GOVERNMENT ABOLISHES PRIVATE DOCTORS' OFFICES

Cologne RHEINISCHER MERKUR in German 14 Jul 78 p 28

[Article by Ladislaus Hory: "No More Private Doctors"]

[Text] Paragraph 42 of the Law 20/1966 empowered the Czechoslovak Ministry of Health to reform the health service. The public was greatly surprised by the new Decree 5/1978--based on the above-mentioned law--which fully prohibited any type of private medical activity. In order to avoid unnecessary irritation of the public, the mass media were prohibited to treat the matter thoroughly. A similar reform was realized already in 1950's with the consequence that only a few dentists and physicians were able to keep their offices with a special permission.

The unified health service was established in 1952. At that time only the most famous specialists were allowed to keep up their private offices. It was not easy even for them, since the authorities put all possible hindrances into their way. The regime treated them as "relics of the capitalist past." According to the "new medical moral" every physician should be happy being able to work in the socialist health sector and should refuse a profit-making private activity. Private physicians were literally isolated from the state health service. Opening of new private offices was literally prohibited by the Decree 129/1958. Ever since private work on the part of a new generation of physicians has been illegal. As a consequence the group of famous private specialists grew increasingly old.

Official statistics did not show the number of private physicians who were forced to rely on private estimates. Twelve dentists and 56 specialists were active in Prague in 1959. Fifty-three specialists closed their offices in Plzen in 1958 alone. No substantial changes occurred during the following 20 years; whoever was able to save himself during the reform, continued in his private work.

Now the bell tolls for privately working specialists. We have to offer a soberly objective balance sheet of the state health service. Reduction of infant mortality is certainly commendable. There have been successes in

cardiology, pharmacology as well as in technical development. On the other hand, the work moral of physicians as well as of the auxiliary personnel has sunk deeply. There are no personal contacts between employees of the state health service and their patients.

The party press published an unbelievable number of letters written by patients who complain about this situation. Their main complaints are psychological rather than material: Indifference, lack of courtesy, crude manners on the part of physicians as well as the nursing personnel, unnecessary long time spent in waiting rooms, especially while waiting for specialized treatment such as X-rays or radiation treatment. As a consequence the ambulatory patients lose many work hours, which they often cannot justify on their work sites. This often means unpleasantness for them. The most widespread subject to complaints--however--is corruption in the health service.

CSO: 2300

CORRUPTION IN SSR WIDESPREAD

Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak 29 Jun 78 p 6

[Article by Geno Penkovsky: "It Does Not Pay To Buy For Five Fingers"]

[Text] Thanks to work of social prevention carried out mainly by the prosecutor's office, the police and organs active in correction, every year we witness a decrease of criminality. Within a single year of higher vigilance--1977--the number of persons prosecuted in Slovakia decreased by 6,500, the number of persons indicted for punishable offenses by almost 4,500. With some exceptions this is valid for all types of violation of law. The development of sentences for misdemeanors shows the same tendency.

Is it much or little? Let's compare. Out of every 10,000 adult inhabitants of the SSR, 159 persons were criminally prosecuted in 1971, only 103 persons were prosecuted last year.

Illegal economic acts may be described as the most important part of punishable activity. Their share grew by 0.5 percent by the end of last year and it represents more than one-fifth of known criminality. In most cases it is closely connected with greed caused by petit bourgeois phenomena. Sometimes we may only presume it and this is in cases where the guilty ones remain unknown. Only 2,500 economic delinquents could be described as "unknown" in Slovakia in 1977. The number of workers is decreasing, but there is an increase of the share of technical and administrative workers, more "sophisticated," more cautious pilferers, usually rank-and-file employees of the organizations damaged by them. And their field of activity is broad.

Two of these were Polish citizen Zdislav Roni and our citizen Engr Zdeno Vasko. They agreed on "cooperation." Six hundred eighty-five popular wooden plates left Poland for Czechoslovakia within the first half of 1977. Black-market-wise Roni received for them almost Kcs 103,000 from his partner. Vasko received even Kcs 21,000 more from the organization Autocomis, United Consumers' Cooperative in Poprad. He retained them without having taken into account that he damaged our foreign exchange. The Poprad Office of Prosecutor settled accounts with him for more than Kcs 30,000.

The okres Office of Prosecutor in Trebisov has a similar record. The indicted Mikulas Beer had hidden in his Kosice apartment silver coins and other objects made of this metal. Altogether 423 (!) pieces. He passed them to Jozsef Nagy-Borsoki for advantageous sale in Hungary on 6 June 1977. However, the illegally transported silver was confiscated by the customs in Slovenske Nove Mesto.

The punishable offense of violation of rules governing goods exchanges between our country and countries abroad is closely connected with the development of tourist traffic, and has become its lamentable side. Some 67 persons committed it in Slovakia in 1977.

Punishable offenses against the economic system make up only 5 percent of all punishable economic offenses but they are dangerous in their substance. Last year they usually appeared in the form of prohibited enterprising and speculation. Wholesale quackery for personal profit: Every possible form of repairs, maintenance, services offered by citizens without steady employment, but also by persons performing them after their regular jobs.

Some people understand economic discipline in a peculiar way. Its most usual unlawful violations are fraudulent deficiencies in businesses. Although punishable offenses against economic discipline are decreasing, fraudulent deficiencies seem to thrive. Painful also are traffic accidents, causing damage to motor vehicles owned by enterprises as well as to the materials transported. These offenses are seldom consistently investigated, mainly because of lagging inspection. The inspection organs are often not even interested in their clarification. Such activities may be even "useful" from a local point of view--for the enterprise and consequently also for individuals. It brings in high--although undeserved--gains, a part of them being converted into high rewards, premiums. The inspectors are often requested to adopt a tolerant standpoint--often by representatives of those organs to whom they are subordinated.

Stefan Leskovjansky, a member of management of the construction group at the Unified Agricultural Cooperative Klatov, gained freedom of movement for this reason. Together with his collaborator Eugen Lokner he earned almost Kcs 138,000 between March 1973 and June 1974. Then their activity was stopped by the Kosice area Office of Prosecutor. Some Kcs 55,000 remained in private pockets, the remainder was used by the construction group for justified, as well as unjustified, expenditures. How did they receive said money? From the payroll of the Unified Agriculture Cooperative showing the names of 21 persons who never worked there.

Two-thirds of those indicted for economic punishable activity and three-quarters of those for economic misdeeds were sentenced for stealing of socialist property. Their number decreased by 9 percent within 1 year and similarly decreasing also is the damage caused to the socialist economy.

Machinations with fuel coupons also have occurred. The perpetrators falsify performance of motor vehicles and other equipment, selling saved coupons mostly to Benzinol workers.

There are still old-fashioned burglaries, with cracking of strong boxes or safes. As an example may serve the burglaries at Cedok and at the Slovak State Savings Bank in Filakovo, where the perpetrator stole money and foreign currency and caused damage of more than Kcs 116,000. He also tried to crack another safe with Kcs 200,000, but he did not succeed. Someone burglarized the Post Office in Rudinska in the Cadca Okres and walked away with Kcs 20,000. Coupons and money stolen at a gas station in Cadca represented an amount of Kcs 34,000.

Burglaries in railroad cars have occurred in Liptovsky Mikulas, Martin and Zilina. Stealing of rather small but valuable electrical spare parts was not prevented in Nizna Tesla. Members of some newly established unified agricultural cooperatives still have the opportunity to exchange the quality cattle owned by the cooperative for their cattle of inferior quality.

Leading hostelry workers make money in an original way: They force cashiers to turn over to them money gained by taking advantage of paying consumers. Should the cashiers refuse, they threaten them--as for instance in the Vrutky restaurant Magura--with firing.

Once more about the gas stations. On the night between 4 and 5 September 1977 under cover of darkness an unknown perpetrator entered the office of the gas station in Spissky Ctvrtok and stole Kcs 80,000 from a metal safe resting in the wall. Two similar cases occurred in the Presov Okres, only less money was stolen. On the other hand, they acquired gasoline coupons.

Apathy is evidenced by the case recorded by the Office of Prosecutor in Spisska Nova Ves under the number Pv 541/77. Beginning in July 1976, a certain Jan Orsulak burglarized not less than 31 times state and cooperative business facilities, causing damage of Kcs 56,000. He was even sufficiently "handy" to "sneak" into the post offices in Margecany and Krompachy, where he also "visited" the state savings bank. Since he did not succeed in opening the safe, he modestly devoted his attention to the sales rooms and warehouses.

The record of Alzbeta Zahorcakova, former manager of the enterprise kitchen of the Czechoslovak Railroad in Kosice, reveals: The indicted caused--during 11 years--by insufficient recording of the receipt and distribution of food damage only Kcs 50,000 short of a full million. She could hardly manage that well and for such a long time, unless something was wrong with the enterprise.

Something similar happened in Stara Lubovna Okres. Jan Marguca working as manager of the butchers' shop was stealing money as well as goods and



damaged the United Consumers' Cooperative by creating a deficit of Kcs 134,000 within less than 2 years. Most surprising is the fact that the shop was supplied with only Kcs 30,000 worth of goods.

Jan Kerestesi, manager of the Stadion Dargov Restaurant in Kosice, was inventive. He tried to cover a shortage and filled 200 vodka bottles with water. And he similarly handled cigarette packs, but an inspection still found 67,000 packs missing.

Fire caused almost Kcs 52 million in direct damages in Slovakia last year. No one will replace the 23 lives. More than 160 people were injured. We have evidence that fire-fighting rules are not sufficiently observed. In many localities they are underestimated, often no consequences are drawn from them. But whenever fire occurs, insufficiencies are being covered up. With them, also their own part of the blame. That was reaffirmed last year during investigations of 459 fires, 46 explosions and 62 traffic accidents which greatly damaged socialist property.

In East Slovakia Kraj alone guilty ones could not find quiet sleep because of 17 explosions. Thus Kcs 873,000 was lost. Traffic accidents damaged our society even more.

Still more bitter are the results of working accidents, in spite of the fact that their number is decreasing. Two hundred forty-four accidents of punishable character occurred last year. It does not hurt less if they are self-inflicted. Thus Jozef I. from the Drazkovec Unified Agricultural Cooperative in the Martin Okres. He walked along a roof under construction without having been secured by a rope. He fell off and caused himself a severe injury.

Some enterprises do not consistently observe work safety rules. Thus Valeria S. from the Lucenec Okres suffered a severe injury while working under influence of alcohol.

Unjustified use of service motor vehicles is being perpetrated mainly by the employees of our enterprises. This type of sin unfavorably causes insufficient possibilities of garaging. In the Central Slovakia Kraj this shows up mainly in agriculture and the construction industries. Responsible workers, gate keepers of the guard service do not devote sufficient attention to incoming and outgoing vehicles. Perhaps the enterprise's drivers will transport construction materials also for their homes....

Friendship characterized by falsity cannot be described as friendship. Hushing up of crimes of other people, be they neighbours, collaborators, acquaintances, is an expression of false fellowship. Specifically in economic criminality. Unfortunately, it is still a rather widespread phenomenon within our society, which values honest, capable people, willing to realize, creatively to validate the principles anchored in the party's documents.

Let's learn to honor law. Thus we shall remove many shortcomings of our economy and our life in general.

WARSAW PACT-NATO COMBAT HELICOPTERS COMPARED

East Berlin FLIEGER-REVUE in German No 5, May 78 pp 196-203

[Article by W. Kopenhagen: "Combat Helicopters"]

[Text] The helicopter is as old as the airplane. During the pioneering years of aviation, both fixed-wing aircraft and gyroplanes were developed. However, numerous attempts to develop a really operational helicopter foundered for many years on the complexity of this aircraft. Not until the end of the 1930's was a somewhat reliable machine of this type constructed. However, mass production was as yet an impossibility and thus the helicopter initially played hardly any role, compared to fixed-wing aircraft, in civilian and military aviation. This was true even during the Second World War, even though it would have been able to assume numerous tasks impossible for a fixed-wing aircraft because of its particular flight capabilities. Only after the Second World War was a completely operational helicopter developed that soon found use in an increasing number of roles. In the military sphere it was first used as a means of transport, for reconnaissance and various other missions. But initially it did not serve as a weapon in the literal sense of the word.

But at the beginning of the 1960's this scene was presented in a Soviet documentary film about combat training of the Soviet Army: Suddenly, from behind a protective group of trees, light helicopters model Mi-1 surprised the "enemy" by rising into the air, hovering briefly, firing several rocket salvos at a group of armored "targets" and disappearing just as suddenly behind cover. Protected by the cover, they flew away...

Now every materiel expert knew that the Mi-1 was a multipurpose helicopter, but that it was unarmed. Did this film denote a new trend in helicopter use? In addition, photographs of the Mi-4 helicopter were published in the Czechoslovak People's Republic technical press which showed two mountings on either side of the fuselage for unguided air-to-ground rockets. Until that time, the Mi-4 was also known to be a multipurpose helicopter of medium size whose military design provided only a 12.7 mm MG for self-defense and for firing at ground targets; this machine gun was located beneath the fuselage in a gondola.

This appearance of rocket-carrying helicopters made it seem probable that these were attempts to arm multipurpose and transport helicopters for engaging ground targets. Why shouldn't the versatile helicopter also carry more extensive weapons systems? But apparently the piston-engine Mi-1 and Mi-4 helicopters were used as models for the supplemental equipping of the following generation of helicopters with different weapons. However, nothing was known about mass production of a rocket-armed Mi-1 or Mi-4. The testing would probably have shown that: Helicopters are not only suited to preparing barricades against tanks from the air by means of skid-mines (which is a normal practice today!). Rather, when armed with anti-tank weapons, they can engage these tanks directly and thus either effectively reinforce ground anti-tank units or attack enemy tanks on their own.

The military designers accomplished the transition from unarmed helicopter, or helicopter armed only with an MG, to a more heavily armed transport helicopter which can be a danger to armored targets, by the Mi-4 successor, the Mi-8. This medium multipurpose helicopter was introduced to the troop units at the beginning of the 1960's and it had a mass-produced mechanism which enabled it to carry two weapons pods on each side (each pod loaded with 16 rockets, 5.7 cm); this represented a considerable firepower. One important prerequisite for this stage of development was the use of jet turbine power plants on the new generation of helicopters. The reduced vibrations generated by the turbine drive made possible a greater hit probability than was possible with the piston-driven helicopter because the sight and weapon system did not shake so much. In addition, the greater flight weight due to the weapon system, aiming and fire control systems and the additional navigational system for flying under difficult conditions was easier to compensate by the significantly more powerful drive.

The Soviet designers did not limit the potentials of the turbine drive solely to those helicopters which were designed to cooperate with ground combat forces: They were also utilized for maritime missions like the equipping of the Soviet Navy at the beginning of the 1960's with the Kamow model Ka-25. These helicopters now stationed on the large anti-submarine cruisers like the "Moscow", "Leningrad" and the recently commissioned "Kiev" are not only equipped with the most modern equipment for submarine search missions, they also carry rockets which can destroy located enemy submarines. In addition to this maritime helicopter, the following helicopters were and are still being used in the naval forces of the socialist defense coalition for similar and other missions: The maritime version of the Mi-4 (Mi-4 MA, known by the large radar equipment under the nose), the Mi-2 and the Mi-8 in special designs. Recently, according to publications in Soviet technical literature, a new type derived from the Mi-8 has been introduced; it can be recognized by its boat-shaped fuselage-base and the large radar equipment in the nose. This helicopter has retractable landing gear.

This much we do know: At the beginning of the 1960's the Soviet designers completed the transition from unarmed or lightly armed helicopters which had several shortcomings (short range, speed and payload, severe vibrations

among others) and which were powered by piston engines to an armed, turbine-powered multipurpose helicopter and, in the case of the Ka-25, to a combat helicopter whose mission consists partly of military transport and, for the most part, of the search and engagement of submarines. Another stage in the development of weapons-carrying helicopters became visible on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Polish People's Republic: For the first time, the Mi-2 built in the Polish aircraft plant WSK Swidnik since 1965 under license from the Soviet Union as a passenger, transport, agricultural and medical helicopter was now presented in an armed version. On the left and right of the landing-gear strut were two of the famous wire-guided anti-tank rockets. Later photographs showed the entire array of armaments of this small helicopter: Besides the guided anti-tank rockets, there was an aircraft cannon, machine guns on the sides or traversable in the window ports and weapons pods with unguided air-to ground rockets. According to Polish publications, the following weapons can be employed on helicopters: single or multiple-barrel 7.62 or 12.7 mm machine-gun, cannons up to 30 mm, unguided rockets up to 127 mm and automatic grenade launchers up to 40 mm. Thus moving targets up to a range of between 1000 and 3000 m can be engaged. Armored combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and tanks can be hit by helicopter-fired, wire-guided anti-tank rockets at ranges up to 2,500 m. But these potentials do not cover all the types of weapons which can be carried by helicopters. This was demonstrated by a recently transmitted Soviet documentary film on the "Iron Division"--a troop unit which withstood its first combat test during the Great Socialist October Revolution. A Soviet motorized rifle unit climbs aboard waiting Mi-8 helicopters. Only after detailed examination is it revealed that these helicopters are a modification of the previously standard type: At the supports for the unguided rockets there are now three pods on each side instead of the previous two. In addition, above each pod there is a track for the guided anti-tank rocket--this represents an enormous increase in firepower! Since it is generally no problem to carry aloft bombs instead of the pods, the armament can be varied here depending on the mission. But even this was not enough: In the film it was seen how the transported infantry held their personal weapons--the Kalashnikov assault rifle or the machine gun--in mountings provided for this purpose at the lower edges of window ports and thereby increased the firepower of the helicopter during flight even more.

The potential of intensifying fire by using the weapons of the infantry squad on board is also utilized by the new Mi-24 helicopter, as is known from publications in Soviet newspapers, books and films. With this model the path of military helicopter development begun in the Soviet Union was continued--namely, that of combat power and rapid transport or landing of troop units. At the same time, the Mi-24 represents a new level of quality which results from the excellent flight characteristics and performance of this machine. They were recently demonstrated convincingly in the "Berisina" maneuver. Soviet military journalists have frequently praised the maneuverable, combat-effective and night operational Mi-24. Colonel Chorobrych reported in the Army Newspaper "Krasnaya Svesda" on a night flight which he undertook in the

machine of helicopter commander Kostyayev: "Comrade Kostyayev climbed into the machine at night. I take the seat of the aircraft commander-operator. Many of the instruments before me are also found on board fighter, bomber and transport aircraft. It was clear to me that the most modern equipment for various missions is concentrated here in this combat helicopter. The rotors begin to move. Shortly thereafter the helicopter raises itself on its foot-pads, hesitates a moment and lifts off. At a height of five to six meters it remains in hovering flight. A moment more and already it is rotating about its own axis in a constantly changing direction. Swing to left and right--check the controls and trim. Then the two strong power plants fire the helicopter aloft. We leave the heliport at a steep angle and fly at a low altitude. Kostyayev says: 'I'm going up!' The nose raises like in an airplane. The acceleration is so great that it presses me into my seat. The indicator of the altimeter swings widely. I can hardly believe that I'm in a helicopter. 'That's right, none of its predecessors could do anything like this!' said Kostyayev. 'It is faster and more maneuverable than all the others.'

To the left and right of the fuselage unguided rockets are released with a deafening noise. The first salvo, the second... In the target area a blazing fireball flames up. One can smell the powder gas in the cockpit. Now we approach the target a second time and fire the aircraft machine gun. On the ground are three tiny lights right in the flight direction. We have to extinguish them with one salvo. Hands on firing button, eyes at the sight: Attack! The ruby-red tracers are fired out far ahead of us. The chatter can be heard in the cockpit itself. Then the lights on the ground are out. But the sky is brightened from the fireworks of shells going up on the ground. We leave the training area at low altitude." The Mi-24 is finding international acclaim. In addition to its flight capabilities and primarily because it is a high-performance combat helicopter which can take a motorized rifle squad on board, the Western press has determined that NATO has nothing like it. In the meantime various models of the Mi-24 are in use. The first has a somewhat angular cockpit with a lot of glass; the commander, copilot (serves as navigator as well) and the infantry are seated here. The second version (see middle pages) [not provided] are distinguished by a compartmentalized cockpit where the rear section is super-elevated. In the second version the visibility conditions would be better for all crew members. The traversable weapon is found in the nose of the first model by the second model has a chin turret. Both models are equipped with short stub wings which assume part of the load from the rotor at the upper velocity range and this permits a quite high flight velocity. This speed is promoted by the retractable three-wheel landing gear which was introduced for the first time on Soviet helicopters of this type. Under the wings are the two depots for insertion of various-sized rocket pods; bombs can also be carried here. On the two outside mountings on each side we find guided anti-tank rockets or guided air-to-ground rockets.

In summary: From unarmed or inadequately armed helicopters designed for numerous transport, reconnaissance and communications missions, development proceeded to armed helicopters which could perform transport and combat missions or pure combat missions. Viewed tactically, the effectively armed helicopter equipped for flights under all conditions of weather or darkness can engage armored vehicles better than all other means because of its maneuverability, mobility and high firepower. Flying just above the ground it can use elevations and depressions for a concealed target approach and, after a short increase in altitude, it can identify the target and fire its rockets, and then move into cover and fly off. Helicopters can also provide air-landed troops with a great deal of support by temporarily performing the role of artillery when the artillery itself is being moved or it can perform numerous other missions. Among these are, for example, direct fire support of troop units on the battlefield. Because the helicopter can fly more slowly than combat aircraft, the pilots are better able to distinguish between friendly and enemy troops; if need be, they can distinguish the battle-line itself. Although there are other advantages and missions for armed helicopters, these should be enough. One expression of the high degree of standardization is the following fact: The armed forces of the socialist defense coalition employ not only the same helicopter types but the helicopter weapons generally correspond to those of the fighters and fighter-bomber aircraft. This is a degree of standardization the likes of which the NATO-procurement authorities can only dream.

Naturally the overall development is not concluded with the present state of helicopter design. For example, the designers are trying to increase the combat power of the helicopter even more by the use of improved fire-control systems and lighter and reduced-maintenance aggregates.

The history of the helicopter in the imperialistic countries runs completely different to the briefly described development of the Soviet armed helicopter: Here the development is distinguished by helicopter employment in the numerous wars of oppression against nations struggling for independence as well as in cases of direct aggression. This first occurred at the beginning of the 1950's by the United States during the aggression against the Korean People's Republic. At that time, the helicopter was a low-performance machine and was used primarily for communications, transport and medical service. It was provisionally equipped with machine guns. The fixed or movable 12.7 to 20mm weapons on helicopters of American, French and British production played a greater role only a few years later when such helicopters were used by the French colonial troops against the growing liberation movement in Indochina.

After their defeat at Dien Bien Phu (1954) the armed forces of France adopted the "experiences" gained in Korea and Indochina with armed helicopters in order to use them in the "Pacification of the Algerian Territory" which was the public name for the terror campaign against the Algerian people who were fighting for their freedom. It was hoped that the mobile helicopter--which was also suited for mountain use--would achieve a surprise effect far above

that of the airplane. Consequently, the liberation fighters made use of all advantages of the territory of their homeland and repeatedly defeated the modernly equipped French troops. From history it is known that the 50 to 70 mm rocket-equipped helicopters used for the first time in Algeria (naturally the automatic weapons were used there as in Korea and Indochina) were no more able to stop the inevitable victory of the Algerian People than were barbed wire or napalm. But the military and aircraft industry of the United States, France and Great Britain drew several conclusions about continuing development of the military helicopter: The helicopter had proven to be of insufficient capability, was too susceptible to malfunction and required much maintenance, it had too little firepower and was too easily shot down. In addition: Except in Korea, the helicopter crews had never had to deal with an enemy air force!

In the second half of the 1950's a feverish development was begun. Soon there was hardly any helicopter model in the Western world for which the attempt had not been made to place cannons and machine guns, guided and unguided rockets or launcher-weapons at all possible locations. The efforts of this development ran in two directions: On the one hand, a higher-performance helicopter was desired and on the other hand, more effective weapons and armaments variations. One outgrowth of this was the suggestion to use helicopters of relatively low range and performance as firing ramps for nuclear remote-controlled weapons--perhaps of the "Honest John" type. This suggestion was made by a U.S. colonel. This was just as absurd as numerous other suggestions to over-arm helicopters because the heavy weapons, the ammunition, aiming instruments, navigation systems for flights under difficult conditions necessarily reduced the range and maneuverability of the rather low-performance models at that time. So there resulted the following facts: The studies demonstrated the utility of provisionally or permanently arming standard helicopters. However, none of the high-armament helicopters--shown widely in propaganda photographs--ever went into mass production. One such touted "Wonder Helicopter", the AH-56A "Cheyenne"--which was supposed to be able to do anything in addition to being the "first genuine combat helicopter"--had to be taken out of service after the construction of ten trial machines because of severe technical deficiencies! Nevertheless, the gamble of the helicopter manufacturers for the delivery of helicopters--even of armed ones--was big business: For their dirty war in Vietnam the U.S. armed forces needed all branches of this extraordinarily versatile war machine. It was particularly suited for terror from the sky. Defense from enemy aircraft was thought improbable and the few nests of resistance on the ground would be easy prey. But when the liberation forces shot down more helicopters than expected, this was reason enough to cry for more, heavily armed helicopters. But the new, more heavily armed Bell UH-1 were shot down just as easily as the "flying tank" CH-47 "Chinook" which proved to be too ponderous, too expensive, and too large a target, or like the OH-6A and the combat helicopter AH-1G. The end result of the Vietnam aggression is known.

In the meantime the military supply companies of the United States have evaluated their Vietnam experiences with regard to weapons carrying helicopters and have developed new models. In particular, the technicians in the United States and its allies are occupied in drawing conclusions for future "frontal defense measures"--which mask their aggressive intentions toward the Socialist Nations. Thus, the United States is continuing development of the Bell AH-1 in several versions; placement of strong combat helicopter contingents in Europe and coercion of its allies to purchase as many of the American helicopters as possible under the cover name "danger for the East" make up the remainder of the American effort. But since the military supply industry of other imperialistic countries is interested in the greatest possible profit, each country is developing its own armed and combat helicopters. The following presentation illustrates just how small the numbers manufactured of a particular model really are and the kind of duplication that exists today in the NATO countries. The fact remains: The maneuverable, heavily armored and heavily armed combat helicopters are a serious factor in any war initiated by the imperialists. Development of such helicopters is proceeding at present in the direction of anti-tank helicopters.

9280-R  
CSO: 2300



## EAST GERMANY

### QUALIFICATIONS OF AIR FORCES GROUND PERSONNEL OUTLINED

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 4, Jan 78 signed to press 9 May 78  
pp 191-194

[Article by Lt Col D. Naumann, engineer: "Training of the Engineer-Technical Personnel of the Air Forces--Basis of High Flight Safety and Combat Readiness"]

[Text] 1. High Flight Safety Calls for Engineering-Technical Safeguards All Around

"It is not enough to have modern technical equipment. The most important thing is for the members of the air forces to strive for the highest military skills in order to apply our technology effectively and creatively" (P. Batitskiy, "Air Defense--A Chief Factor in the Country's Defense Capability," MILITAERWESEN, Berlin, 1976, No 10, p 94).

Those words, by the commander in chief of the air forces of the Soviet Union, Marshal P. Batitskiy, have more topical significance than ever to the members of the Air Force Air Defense Command of the National People's Army. The growing proportion of collective work in the handling and operating of combat equipment requires more deeply understanding the nature of the relations between man and technology. Party-minded standpoints are necessary for further improving the flight safety and combat readiness of the air forces. Under those aspects the relationship between man and technology has to be viewed, encompassing all the consequences resulting therefrom for the service in the troop components, staffs and facilities of the air forces.

Basic familiarity with the process of applying engineering-technical safeguards and with the combat characteristics of the aircraft is an indispensable prerequisite for all commanding officers, political workers, staff workers, the members of the rear services and of course also the leadership cadre of the air force engineering service. Expert command decisions depend on it.

In building an airport, for example, a sensible arrangement of the hangars and runways is important for safe and rapid combat training and for an effective handling by which engineering-technical safeguards are set up. The commanding officer of a formation or troop component must know, for example, what the consequences are of a change in weaponry ordered late in the course

or of shifting to different airports. Confusion often results from ignoring or not knowing engineering-technical concerns even when an order is given. Confusion, however, is most detrimental to flight safety.

Engineering-technical personnel directly assure the operational readiness of technical aircraft equipment. Especially in aircraft technology, great transformations and changes have been introduced by the revolution in military affairs. The jet fighter of the 1950's, for example, had some 50 mechanisms and systems. Its state of automation was low. For the engineering-technical safeguarding of one hour of flight, relatively few working hours were then needed. This can be explained by the following: The measuring and testing devices and the other ground equipment amounted to a few, uncomplicated instruments. The command process in aircraft engineering was relatively simple because the various technical areas met their tasks independently of each other (having the classical composition of battery/propulsive unit, special electrical equipment, radio/radar equipment and aircraft armament); engineering-technical safeguards did not work under decentralized conditions; and the organization and implementation of troop repair activities made no high demands on any degree of specialization, the technological process was relatively simple to follow and one did not greatly have to rely on complicated and extensive measuring and testing devices.

Training facilities and troop components thus could provide army personnel with the knowledge and skills they needed within a brief time span. As there were fewer components installed in the aircraft which were under less stress, being in the subsonic range, the breakdown rate was smaller too. That in turn also held down the interference factors in the engineering-technical safeguarding process.

Today's modern fighter aircraft has tens of thousands of components. Its mechanisms and systems are highly automated. The use of automated guidance systems, autopilots, complex navigational systems, automatic steering systems, modern computers aboard, laser equipment and so forth more and more blurs the boundaries among the various technical fields and gives rise to new specialized approaches.

Proper operation and maintenance require comprehensive and complicated measuring and testing devices.

Because of the modern components used, and of the great variety and complicated nature of the aircraft systems, incomparably higher demands must today be made on the training of engineer-technical personnel.

In the 1950's, a mechanic could still use and operate the requisite measuring and testing tools. Today's measuring and testing facilities consist, among other things, of automated control stations run by technicians and engineers. Troop repair is the field which demonstrates that particularly.

The use of modern technology, of semiconductor components and integrated circuits, also makes high demands on basic science knowledge.

Rapid, technically proper repairs and the testing of technical aircraft equipment are as important to high flight safety as the correct operation and maintenance.

## 2. Training and Military Economy

For the sake of assuring a high degree of technological operational readiness the executive engineer-technical personnel on all levels must constantly be completely informed about the status of technical aircraft equipment.

To maintain and reestablish the high degree of technological operational readiness required, forces and means have to be used effectively on the basis of expert decisions. That, in addition to technical knowledge, also calls for organizational skills. Fooling around unscientifically and in the traditional manner only results for the engineer-technical personnel to be used unsuitably, so that the time available will not be enough for solving the tasks. But that would unavoidably diminish the flight safety which depends on systematic work, continuity and time schedules.

Because the modern equipment is so complicated, the repair of defective or rejected aggregates, blocks and components calls for increasingly greater efforts. Often spare parts come from far distant places, or defective parts have to go to special workshops, and much time is lost in between.

And then also, breakdowns and defects in technical aircraft equipment is a matter that is sometimes still being investigated with insufficient expertise. Superiors may issue deadlines that are too short, which may cause rash actions and thereby fail to lead to an extensive analysis of causes.

Superiors must make absolutely sure whether a short deadline in any given case is necessary in the interest of flight safety. On the other hand, it is to be blamed on lack of knowledge about the working methods of installations and systems and about how they operate together that the scope of the investigations is unjustifiably lengthened, spare parts are wasted or operationally ready equipment is sent for repair. That is an additional burden on supply and maintenance units, and sometimes this may even interrupt the regular supply chain. Combat readiness is directly diminished thereby. The high, and unjustified, economic effort involved in that should also be mentioned. Some of the executive engineer-technical personnel, it turns out, still do not use sufficiently the data provided by objective checks for prevention and for investigating breakdowns.

Those examples underscore how much flight security, combat readiness, as well as the concerns of military economy, depend on expertise in assigning tasks and on high-grade methods of investigation.

### 3. How To Maintain Properly the Training of Engineer-Technical Personnel

The training of army personnel is the basic premise for effective use of technical aircraft equipment. They have to study hard.

And the training personnel must also always try to instruct in those subject matters through high pedagogical skills, excellent methods and high-grade expertise.

What is to be done?

We know from experience that the time allocated on the annual schedules for advanced specialized technical training is a mere minimum.

There is so much to learn, especially for executive personnel, that extra time must be found for carrying out specialized technical advanced training. Such possibilities are found, time and again, in between flights during combat training, either because of meteorological or other waiting periods. Every commanding officer should be aware that his decision, taken at the proper time, is the essential basis for great effectiveness in proceeding toward ground training.

The chief of the aircraft engineering service in the troop components and independent units should always keep in reserve high-grade training subjects so that specialized technical advanced training can always be picked up without loss in time and quality.

The concept of "complex, combat-related training" should also be understood in such a way that, along with the elements of general military training and of military physical training, practical tasks are solved, systematically and periodically, within the scope of specialized technical advanced training like, for instance, instruction in teaching methods, training in alternating aircraft armament and so forth.

Technical aircraft game exercises must still be used more for constantly affecting engineer-technical personnel. To be successful, this must be done centrally, must be rigidly organized and must be directed by the most highly qualified cadre.

Great attention ought to be given to the development of the training base. This will make possible proceeding while "still in motion," as it were, toward qualified specialized technical advanced training.

The work with young officers has to be given particular attention. Those army members will be induced to deal thoroughly with the technology entrusted to them by such requirements as the preparation of instruction plans, the preparation of analyses of complicated breakdowns in the equipment or of breakdown investigations algorithms, sequential procedural plans and so forth. Prerequisite to it is, of course, that high demands are made, aid and guidance are given, tasks assigned are conscientiously checked, and the documentation prepared does not end up in a "drawer."

Training also has to be taken into account in socialist competition and in the "Q" movement.

The high point in the training for engineer-technical personnel during the training year certainly is the preparation for examinations leading to certifications on all skill levels. The more systematic and long-range this preparation is, the greater is the benefit.

Flight safety is significantly affected by the aircraft technicians. Their training is based on the awareness that being an aircraft technician does not merely mean being in charge of a valuable and complicated weapons system and, at best, a specialist in a particular field like battery/propulsion system, but that they are fully responsible for the overall condition and the operational readiness of the aircraft. That has to show itself in intolerance toward any kind of tendencies of superficiality and routine, violations of service regulations and maintenance instructions, and operational errors by the flying and engineer-technical personnel. Great knowledge about the equipment of his aircraft, all the various parts of it, provides him with the ability to carry out an all-inclusive maintenance for his aircraft and to handle the control function properly. In combat, flight safety will above all depend on the circumspect actions and expertise of the aircraft technician. Every chief of the aircraft engineer service should therefore pay special attention to the training and advanced training of the aircraft technician.

An analysis of materials through an objective check of the devices aboard requires that one understands what the devices report as well as constant exercise and experience. It has not yet become standard procedure everywhere to start the analysis by exploiting that material. That is also true of such special fields as aircraft weaponry and radar equipment. As the causes for breakdown or irregularities cannot be read "in clear text" from the objective control materials, it is indispensable to prepare a model catalog for typical defects and breakdowns in technical aircraft equipment that can be determined through objective controls by devices aboard.

Based on these experiential data, engineer-technical personnel from the level of aircraft technician and up must still get better qualifications for using such material with expertise for improving flight safety, be they the engineers in charge, members of investigation commissions or the aircraft technicians. Often that also saves much time and money.

Good knowledge about the basic aircraft engineering regulations and the ability to apply them are what it takes to do a fine job. In the training of mechanics the emphasis must be placed on teaching practical skills and the familiarity with normal conditions, the extent of the weaponry and the location of the aircraft components.

#### 4. Concluding Remarks

Training engineer-technical personnel is a steady process beginning with the first hour of instruction in the technical training facilities of the air forces. It must affect each and every member of aircraft engineering until he quits active military service. This training process culminates in maintaining and reinforcing a high status of training for engineer-technical personnel on the one hand and in assuring highly qualified maintenance of engineer-technical safeguards, on the other.

The level reached in this affects the flight safety and combat readiness of the air forces directly. Where commanding officers and chiefs give training the necessary attention, flight safety is the greatest and combat training finds its most solid engineer-technical support.

5885

CSO: 2300

EAST GERMANY

PROSPECTS, SUBJECTS FOR SCHMIDT-HONECKER SUMMIT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 19 Jun 78 pp 21-23

[Article: "German Summit in Fall"]

[Text] Last week SED Chief Erich Honecker indicated more clearly than he had done for a long time he was willing to talk with Bonn. For a meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Honecker wants to offer concessions in road construction and, for the time being, avoid controversial questions like the Elbe border and GDR citizenship.

State Secretary Guenter Gaus had a rare experience: He met a German chief of state with expertise and detailed knowledge in the difficult field of German politics.

In contrast to Helmut Schmidt, Gaus' supervisor, who is only moderately interested in the trivialities of relations with East Berlin, Erich Honecker, SED general secretary and chairman of the GDR Council of State, proved to be a well-prepared partner in talk, familiar even with tricky questions, during the audience for Bonn's permanent representative on Monday last week. Gaus remarked to intimates: "A few gentlemen in the chancellor's office could learn a few things there "

Analysts in the chancellor's office are appraising the situation, and they are looking upon that which the representative reported on his 90 minutes with Honecker to the unpopular central office in Bonn, and subsequently before the Inner-German Committee of the Bundestag, as a signal for another new beginning of German-German negotiations. It is the desire of the East German ruler that these negotiations be successfully conducted during a summit meeting between the West German chancellor and the East German chief of state--if possible still during the fall of this year.

Helmut Schmidt interpreted the signal from the GDR as success of his May talks in Bonn with Soviet state and party chief Leonid Brezhnev: Allowing

4 weeks for reflection, Honecker's surprising invitation to Gaus followed the visit of Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko in East Berlin. The Russian had conveyed to the East German allies Brezhnev's request to put into practice Soviet promises concerning German-German relations.

The first step was not easy for Honecker. Only a short time ago the SED chief had asked Karl Seidel, department head in the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to lodge a complaint with Gaus because the West German chancellor had slandered the GDR during his talks with Brezhnev, by referring to it as "a state which is still not complete."

During Monday's conference in the East Berlin office of the Council of State --Gaus had come by himself, Honecker had brought Herrmann, his office manager, whom he introduced as his "closest coworker--the SED man came straight to the point.

Honecker, who to date has shown interest in a meeting with Schmidt to strengthen his wavering domestic position of political power even if the summit should produce no concrete results, did indeed switch his position toward Gaus, supporting Schmidt's position. In his most recent written message to the general secretary, Bonn's chief of government let it be known that he considered a meeting meaningful only if it would produce advantages for both sides. Honecker's comment: The results must have "public appeal."

However, the results of the summit cannot be very abundant--for lack of substance. Said Honecker to Gaus: The most likely accomplishments will be in the area of transportation, where treaties ready for signature may be prepared. Official negotiations about the northern autobahn between Hamburg and West Berlin could begin immediately. With regard to the guidelines, the GDR is "totally flexible."

The SED man had only one request of the permanent representative: to consider the sensitive ally in Moscow. The chairman of the Council of State recommended that during future negotiations Bonn should pay careful attention to linguistic nuances. For instance, it would serve no purpose to celebrate the autobahn construction as another example of the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. Instead, this was Honecker's advice, West Germans should point to the reduction in travel time between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, in an attempt to justify the high cost--DM 1.3 billion--to taxpayers.

The chief of state subsequently addressed the "big solution": The GDR was not only willing to construct the northern route but it would also agree to build the 30-kilometer link between Eisenach and the road leading to Hersfeld if Bonn would assume the cost--totaling DM 280 million, 90 million of which would be needed for a bridge across the Werra Valley.

The new autobahn would bring relief to the border state of Hessen--for Helmut Schmidt it is an important factor when calculating the most favorable



time for his meeting with Honecker. The chancellor would certainly be even more willing to travel to the GDR if the summit spectacle could take place before the parliamentary elections in Hessen and Bavaria, scheduled for the fall of this year.

The result of the work on the exact course of the border between the Federal Republic and the GDR, which has been progressing well, could then be used for a signing ceremony which would have great effect on the voters. Honecker indicated to Gaus that he was basically willing to exclude, for the time being, the controversial Elbe question--whether the line of demarcation between Schnackenburg and Lauenburg runs in the middle of the river (Eastern position) or along the east bank (Western position)--and to postpone the debate until after the Bundestag election.

The SED chief promised to respect the status quo until a final ruling had been reached even though the current situation is unsatisfactory or even "threatening," because the GDR has to live with an "exposed front" in a boundary position between military blocs until the Elbe border is regulated.

Also with regard to the reopening of the Berlin Teltow Canal--by no means only a technical transportation problem--Honecker indicated a willingness to compromise.

First, the general secretary sought to circumvent the topic with his remark that the only important thing left was to agree on the cost. Gaus, however, stuck to his principle and emphasized the fact that Boon could not acquiesce to the GDR demand to negotiate solely with the West Berlin Senat concerning the canal. It is a matter for the Federal Republic, in other words, a matter for Bonn's permanent representative in East Berlin.

With regard to this question, the Federal Republic must also consider the sensitivities of the Western allies--particularly the French--and object to direct negotiations concerning the canal between East and West Berlin because of the four-power statute.

Honecker conceded that the wishes of the Western allies could definitely be considered. Gaus should soon send a deposition on Bonn's position the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in East Berlin. Subsequently, purely technical talks between the GDR and the Senat could proceed. Upon conclusion of the negotiations, East Berlin would deliver a statement to Bonn concerning the provisions for use of the canal, and it would accept a corresponding statement on this matter from the Federal Government.

Honecker added, in an excursus, some general statements about his opinion on the role of the two German states within the framework of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin. The GDR and the Federal Republic, although they were not signatory nations, had "specific responsibilities." To be sure, currently there was no Berlin crisis, but the city remains a sensitive item in European politics of detente.

Honecker asked Gaus, his partner in talk, explicitly to convey to Governing Mayor Dietrich Stobbe the piece of advice that in the future he should say less about the "status for all of Berlin." Today we can only philosophize about it. In political practice only West Berlin and the capital of the GDR are realities. Even the occasional talks between Stobbe and Pyotr Abrasimov, Soviet ambassador to East Berlin, cannot change this fact.

Honecker, the unity socialist praised by Gaus for being "friendly," side-stepped his demonstrative conciliatory attitude only when delivering dutiful protests. The Federal Republic should no longer hide behind the argument that--because it is a matter for the Laender--it had no influence on the activities of the central office in Salzgitter which is registering violations of human rights in the GDR. Honecker: The West German guardians of rights are mixing directly into the domestic affairs of the GDR, which is in violation of the basic agreement.

Orders issued by the federal minister of the interior to the Federal Border Police that particularly visitors from the GDR be thoroughly frisked and interrogated are also discriminatory, Honecker continued.

In a lengthy statement the general secretary deplored the coverage of the GDR by the West German press, radio and television, which is damaging to mutual relations. Even if the Federal Government states that it does not control West German media, every government is, after all, responsible for its press.

Gaus, formerly a journalist, was warned by Honecker that too much publicity would be detrimental to the negotiations about to begin.

For instance, the chairman complained about West German reports that the German mark was a second currency in the GDR, although criticism in the GDR itself had been quite audible for some time. State Intershops for foreign currencies had been established only to facilitate tourist traffic from the West. The fact that also GDR citizens are permitted to make purchases with Western currency is merely a humane gesture. However, this human kindness could easily be revoked at any time.

Concerning a general easing of conditions for the people Honecker warned Bonn to use more restraint. The important thing was to preserve what had been accomplished; at the present time the GDR could not promise additional concessions. This means that the SED general secretary moved away from offers which were made last summer to Herbert Wehner, chairman of the SPD faction, by GDR Attorney Wolfgang Vogel. At that time, in exchange for foreign currency from Bonn, the SED chief wanted to lower the age for travelers to the West. Now Honecker said to Gaus: He had little hope that something could be done in this area.

Still, an indication that the GDR is very much interested in continuing cooperation with Bonn is the demonstrated lack of interest by the chairman

of the Council of State in speedy recognition of separate GDR citizenship. Until recently this demand by the SED leadership was considered an unalterable item on the agenda for future talks. According to Honecker, Bonn needed only to accept the competency of the GDR for East German citizens--which it has been doing for years--and it should not mix into affairs of East German citizenship in third countries, something which it ceased to do some time ago.

Last Wednesday Helmut Schmidt received additional proof that Honecker was serious about his offer for negotiations. Michael Kohl, the authorized representative from the GDR, announced himself in the chancellor's office, handed to the chancellor a note from the chairman of the Council of State and talked for 2 hours about the intentions of his superior.

Bonn already knew the contents of Honecker's note and Kohl's presentation: It was in exact agreement with those statements which were made 2 days earlier in East Berlin to Gaus, Schmidt's representative.

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CSO: 3103

EAST GERMANY

BRIEFS

CONTINUED BIRTHRATE INCREASE--During the first half of 1978, 118,800 children were born in the GDR, or 5,900 more than in the same period of 1977. According to OMR [chief public health officer] Dr Helga Rayner, Ministry for Public Health, the maternal mortality rate was reduced to 1.8 per 10,000 births in 1977; in 1952 it was still 16.5 per 10,000 births. [Excerpts] [East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 18 Jul 78 p 1]

CSO: 2300



BUDAPEST DAILY COMMENTS ON RESULTS OF UN SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Budapest MTI in English 1046 GMT 4 Jul 78 LD

[Text] Budapest, 4 July (MTI)--NEPSZABADSAG today comments on the closing document of the UN disarmament session under the headline "Need For Advance." "The session had to be lengthened," says the article. On the day scheduled originally for conclusion there were about 100 items on which the participants could not agree. Knowing this, those who read the document may feel certain disappointment since the final wordings have the sign of compromise on them and do not reflect a breakthrough towards disarmament. After the second reading, however, we may conclude that, speaking figuratively, the compromise does not mean this time that the distance between the positions of the Warsaw Treaty and of NATO has simply been halved. No, because in many respects the document is nearer the stands and programs outlined by the socialist countries, even if not in respect of the concrete proposals but at least in the order and way of approach to the problems. We must not undervalue the importance of this even when we know that the greater part of the General Assembly's document has primarily political-moral significance."

Further on the article sums up the four major trends where the socialist diplomacy intends to attain progress. These are: the discontinuation of the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons, the discontinuation of the manufacture of other mass-destruction weapons and the banning of these arms, the end of developing new traditional weapon systems of big destructive force and the renouncement of increasing the armies and the traditional arms by the permanent members of the Security Council and by the countries attached to them by military agreements.

After the enumeration the columnist notes that the whole course of the session has reflected the realization that the countries of the Third World think this program attractive and far [as received] not only the countries which declared their choice of the socialist trend.

Speaking about counter-forces, the commentary says, "China has also this time opposed all kinds of disarmament efforts. As far as NATO countries

are concerned, their speakers voiced, of course, their stances in favor of disarmament and against the armaments race. The importance of even that much is not to be disesteemed because we listen to words on disarmament rather than war threatening. However, it is obvious that now primarily realistic plans and concrete commitments would be needed and as the signs indicate neither the United States nor most of its allies are ready for this," writes the commentator, adding that it produced with right indignation by the international public opinion that those who widely avoided the answering of actual questions (what to decrease and to ban, in what way and during what time) were shrinking back from concrete issues at the NATO Summit Meeting held simultaneously in Washington. At the initiative of certain NATO countries a long-range military development and modernization program unprecedented so far in the organization's history has been worked out. And at the NATO Armaments Conference held in the Belgian capital the participants discussed the practical questions of the development of new-type weapons, what is more of a new type strategical weapon system, the Cruise Missile.

"So the counter-forces are very active and want to dictate a pace that cannot be kept by disarmament-diplomatic efforts. Also for this reason it is important that the significance of the time-factor and the idea that all states have to be included actively in the disarmament efforts have been widely expressed at the conference concluded in New York. It is especially important that an agreement was reached not only on holding a new disarmament session but also on convening the Disarmament World Conference. This also indicates that in the forthcoming period disarmament will be the main issue on the international diplomacy's agenda, even more than so far, concludes NEPSZABADSAG's commentary.

CSO: 2020

SITUATION OF PARTY, ECONOMY, DISSIDENTS EXAMINED

Paris KULTURA in Polish No 7-8, Jul-Aug 78 pp 3-9

[Article by Zygmunt Ossowski: "The Situation is Vague"]

[Text] You came to Paris, write what is the situation in the country, said Editor Jerzy Giedroyc. But how am I to fill this order, since in general there is no situation or, to put it differently, it is vague? The opposition has weakened somewhat, the government has weakened still more, hunger rules the country, a return of social diseases such as tuberculosis is imminent, the biological and moral state of society is terrible. It seems that all the nadirs of Polish misfortunes have already been reached and exceeded, the Party has lost all face, and all that remains is the impotence equally of the rulers as of the ruled.

Why, in the face of all this, is there not a spontaneous explosion, a reflex by a society driven past patience, and a dramatic protest by the intellectuals? It does not happen because it would be ineffective, it would be drowned in blood and repressions. There would not even be a Soviet intervention, because the Soviets have everything in place, prepared on Polish territory, and are at any moment ready for confrontation. Surprisingly deft is the tactic which the Soviets "advised" the Party and the security services to adopt in their struggle with the opposition. There are no mass arrests, no mass repressions, but there is a constant and systematic torment which gives no relaxation. Slowly and quietly the lecturers and participants in TKN [Society for Academic Courses] courses are removed from work, high fines are imposed on the owners of the places in which lectures take place, concerned parties are detained, a deft game is conducted to exhaust people.

Can this game end with the success of the authorities? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that breaks must occur in TKN activities, if only in connection with examination periods at institutions of learning. Nor would we make light of the fact that an ever greater number of the youth is expelled from studies. This constitutes a blow, dangerous for the opposition and all of society, at the young and most valuable generation. This requires great moderation and a great sense of responsibility on the part of KOR [Workers Defense



Committee] and TKN. What is most important, in the final analysis, is that we have a youth which has completed normal studies which permit it to pursue normal professional work. At the same time, though, it would be an illusion to suppose that the democratic opposition will give up further struggle and capitulate. This is impossible now, not only because its leaders cannot go back, but also because the masses will not permit them to go back. The opposition has become a mass movement. It is precisely this which causes the authorities to struggle with it guardedly, although, where they are able, cruelly. Both the opposition and the government know the limits of their possibilities and, in a certain sense, both sides are in an impasse. The conflict, which it seemed would be played to a conclusion during the course of a few months in 1976, has been drawn out onto a scale of years, and this has left each of the sides participating in it in an exceptionally difficult situation.

This creates a natural tendency toward polarization both in the Party and in the opposition. In the Party, truth to tell, there are no crystallized factions modeled on the old revisionists or partisans, because all have now grasped the fact that roles are dispensed by the Russians, not by the play of factions. In the Party, though, there are deep differences of opinion about the struggle with the opposition. Andrzej Werblan, who belongs to the hard wing in the PZPR, in his instructions for the ideological aktiv, announced the undertaking of further legal measures against the opposition, which simply means a policy of repression. Only and exclusively the Party's fear in the face of catastrophic economic situation puts a brake on repressions.

In its policy toward society we see both the duality of the Party line and its extemporaneous nature. The last months were occupied above all by the struggle with the Society for Academic Courses. Attempts were made to isolate Michnik and Kuron by propagating the idea that, if it were not for them, who bring in political contents, the authorities would tolerate limited TKN activities. By no means, though, was there any toleration, and TKN was fought by all means available to the authorities. At the same time, the world-wide scandal called forth by KOR's publicization of the PRL censorship materials caused a "relative" relaxation of the censorship, which is especially visible by the example of some publications in POLITYKA, and it will probably find expression in the press and in books published on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of regaining independence. That sixtieth anniversary was very deftly conceived. On the one hand, it is a response to society's need for modern history and for an affirmation of our Polish separateness; on the other hand, it is meant to include the history of the PRL in the sixty years of independent Poland. No one, however, will believe this last point. But a concession by the Party, even if in large measure deceitful, to the real desires of society is an undoubtable fact. Everyone now waits to see whether the biographies of Pilsudski and Sikorski, the history of the Armia Krajowa, and books about the twenty years between the wars will appear and to what extent they will be free from mendacity.

It seems that, in the case of culture, the last Congress of the Union of writers brought a temporary loosening of the Party screw, but the "hawks" have by no means given up. Despite the death of Wilhelmi in an airplane disaster in Bulgaria, in Film Polski, his will be the victory from beyond the grave. Mietkowski, the new Minister of Culture, a weak man without his own visage or personality, is receiving an entourage composed precisely of men who are hard and who have a decidedly "antinationalist" attitude. The "nationalists" will leave the Ministry of Culture and it will become a Ministry (!) of Propaganda. Here Soviet instructions are so decided that one ought not, for the longer run, have any illusions. The easing of censorship is also temporary and short-lived.

The duality of the Party line can be observed not only in connection with relations to the opposition and with cultural policy. It is also clearly visible in religious policy. After loud propaganda exploitation of Gierek's meeting with Cardinal Wyszynski and with the Pope, the idyl ended. All that remained of it were pretenses in the friendly tone of discussions and in the communiques beaten out in the press about the Corpus Christi festivities. There remained also the appropriate courtesy toward Msgr. Poggi, who came from the Vatican and wants to spend more time in Warsaw, although there is not much to talk about with him. Behind the ceremonial forms, which can even take some new form of Warsaw-Vatican diplomatic relations, there is no serious content. All the demands made by Cardinal Wyszynski in his celebrated Three Kings sermon, with the request for public-legal personality for the Church at the top of the list, have remained without reply. Cardinal Wyszynski, therefore, has no illusions and basically everything has returned to normal. Maybe there is some tiny chance that, with the perpetuation of already permanent economic difficulties, some single demand of the Church will be granted in some exceptionally critical moment, but no more. The moderate wing of the Party, to which its First Secretary always belongs, because the rulers best know the hopelessness of the situation, creates pretenses which are first exploited propagandistically by Party dogmatists and are then diligently torpedoed by them. Such were also the deeds of the last detente between Church and state. Actually, Gierek already twice tried detente with the Church, the first time immediately after coming to power, when Jaroszewicz conferred with Cardinal Wyszynski, and just lately in the face of a catastrophic economic situation. In both cases the Russians, right after the creation of the pretenses of detente, said a hard "no." The last time this took place at the Budapest conference of the ideological secretaries of the Bloc parties. This does not mean that further attempts will not be made in the future to disorient the Church and opinion with friendly and dovish courtship of the bishops, especially if this could be used against the opposition. As it proved, though, the Polish bishops are much experienced men, and "certain forces" in the Party are doing everything to deepen their experience. Western journalists accredited in Warsaw found somewhere four successive issues of the journal MYSL SPOLECZNA, which is published by the progovernment association Caritas, which is an assemblage of priest-patriots. No Pole, of course, reads this journal. This time

there appeared four successive sharp attacks against the Polish bishops. And what attacks. Someone clearly and brutally had put the brakes on Gierek's pro-Church manipulations. This policy ended before it began. The greatest enemies of Communists, of course, are Communists.

Finally the most important issue from the point of view of Party policy. This can be taken care of briefly. The Party has no concept of how to get out of the current economic crisis. It really does not. Even economic planning has been transformed into quarterly divisions of the scanty foreign currency funds available to the authorities of the PRL. The burdens and consequences of the bankruptcy of the economic policy of Gierek's team have been, with complete cynicism, thrown onto society, while security against its anger is pursued by a constant strengthening of the security organs. After exhausting all possibilities of Western loans, it was decided to turn to the Russians for salvation. But Brezhnev, the slowly dying czar, has his own problems. He refused to give any very serious economic help to Gierek, and he especially refused to increase oil exports to Poland, which Gierek especially sought in order to save the PRL's foreign currency balance. Brezhnev, though, propped Gierek up in a matter of greater personal importance than the economy, in the matter most important to Communists--in the matter of power. He agreed to recall the Soviet ambassador, Pilotovich, who was hated in Warsaw and was, as if against Gierek, hatching some plots with Szlachcic. This was generally accepted in the PZPR as an act further strengthening Gierek's position; Pilotovich, seeing the economic crash from up close, sought somehow to safeguard himself and was meeting with Szlachcic, who had been overthrown by Gierek, and this was salt in the eye of the First Secretary. Thus, he gained the recall of the Soviet ambassador, without, however, gaining the indispensable economic help. Thus, Gierek strengthened himself, at any rate until the end of the Brezhnev era or until unanticipated economic-related social earthquakes, which are possible, which no one wants, but which could be called forth by even a minor malfunction in the ramshackle machinery of the system.

The hopeless position of the Party does not at all improve or make easier the situation of the opposition and of society. In so delicate a situation in the country and in the face of the refined methods with which it is fought against, the opposition has complicated problems. It cannot disappoint the youth, which trusts it, but it cannot bring things to the point of mass expulsions of the youth from universities. Tensions, heated discussions, and different positions certainly exist in KOR and TKN. In the Movement for the Rights of Man and the Citizen [ROPCO] things came to the point of a sensational turnaround through the elimination of Leszek Moczulski, its recent leader. The Student Self Defense Committees, which the Party fears above all else, are also most sharply combatted by the security authorities. The permanent socio-economic and political crisis in the PRL forces the opposition to shift its concepts of action over to a scale of years. This is a very difficult operation. The successes of the democratic opposition, its growing influence

on the youth, and its press and publishing activity are impressive. Despite this, one must also realistically see the immense difficulties with which the opposition is struggling. What we have been hearing lately, that the opposition is at best a matter of a hundred or a few more people, is not true. There are significantly more people. Yet we cannot see a sufficiently clear tactic which, without decreasing pressure on the regime, would safeguard the youth from such drastic consequences of acting within the framework of the opposition as expulsion from studies.

A surprise for the Party, on the other hand, was the "intellectual revolt." We already hear about tens of Polish authors intending to publish in the West. These people do not hide this at all, and the passports refusals and other repressions coming as a result of these publications condemn them to constant publishing in the West, since whoever has tried the taste of truth finds it difficult to return to the traditional self-censorship and the binding convention of half truth. It seems that in two years we will have a rich Polish literature in the West. This is good, if only the literature will be of higher quality than that hitherto sent here from the country. Free writing should above all be good writing.

Why is the situation in Poland vague? This results in large measure from the hopeless position of the Party, which must nevertheless remain in power, and from the difficulties in arranging a strategy appropriate to the situation by the opposition, which nevertheless cannot capitulate. The major cause of the vagueness of the situation in the country, however, is the attitude of society, of its widest masses. Society hates that which exists, succumbs to demoralization, alcoholism, or apathy, is not susceptible to regime propaganda, willingly takes part in religious demonstrations, but has no clearly delineated visage, with the possible exception of the youth, which, actually, is both understandable and cheering. Polish society, in its great majority, is a deep secret, and it is never exactly known when it will unanticipatedly explode or when it will for years bear an unbearable situation. Where is the root of this secret?

Gierek, experiencing his successive defeats, in talks with those closest to him blames society for everything. We have a difficult nation, it is said in the Central Committee. Regime publications pour buckets of slops on society, and the struggle with our national faults and social shortcomings has become the favored method of rendering impossible more serious criticisms of the rulers. The opposition also would prefer that society be less anaesthetized and more committed and that it have a clearer visage. Poles, however, do have a clear visage, but only from time to time, and it cannot be otherwise.

In a totalitarian system, the masses cannot be heroic on a daily basis. In a totalitarian system based on the principle of one employer, which is the state, it is impossible to conduct an unceasing revolt. Millions of people cannot live on assistance and on payments offered to them, but must work hard, sometimes beyond their strength. Sometimes these people are so bereft of any other exit that they consciously rob their one employer. Sometimes they steal from habit, and they drink to forget about everything. The

moral picture of society is a really unhappy one, with this one reservation, however, that the processes of demoralization go on because society is badly governed, and not the reverse.

It is, however, completely clear that no theories of national faults and social shortcomings explain either the failure of the government or a certain weakness on the part of society. Its picture is seriously affected by social shifts, the migration from country to city, from one branch of production to others, from one locale to others, to the most frequent situation in which men go beyond the sphere of traditional ties and beyond natural, not imposed, instruments of social control. Polish society is constantly in a state of motion, it is constantly relocating itself, it unceasingly seeks conditions which are more bearable, more beneficial, and more in line with their higher civilizational and existential aspirations, which are decidedly oriented toward Western models. Under the conditions of an economic system which is absurd on principle, such a society must be prostrated with difficulty it yields to pedagogical manipulations, and it rather chaotically tends in the direction of satisfying its own individual purposes. A society-wide purpose seems, on account of social absurdities, to be an unreal abstraction to anyone who is even a little bit clever. The purposes of the opposition are sympathetic, but distant from everyday life, unless one's own son or daughter is booted out of an institute of higher education.

The primary characteristic of society, however, is exhaustion. Polish women are deathly wearied by a struggle to provide for their home linked with simultaneous and necessary work for income. The youth is overburdened with absurd school programs. Men not only work, but also earn income outside of their work in a second meta-official sphere of social, economic, and professional life. Everyone drinks from exhaustion, everyone schemes, everyone conducts the strangest deals, everyone struggles for existence or aims to enrich himself, which does not seem to me, after 33 years of peace, to be either objectionable or abnormal. Some struggle for existence, for the minimum necessary to live, and others for a more bearable and more convenient life. And all are deathly exhausted by this struggle. And for this reason, most of society, with the exception of circles which are exceptionally sensitive, young, or somehow privileged, is socially and politically rather vague and experiences no special situation, or rather experiences it in a manner which is rather individual and very painful.

Everything which we say here does not, of course, pertain to the positive and negative margins of society, to the declared idealists and to the exceptional scoundrels. While apologizing for putting the two together, I must state that these two categories of people have their own needs and purposes, which are separate from the gray masses. The masses live in a manner which is truly gray; they are moderately well informed, much like the masses in the West, actually, or maybe even somewhat better, since one cannot fail to know how terrible communism is when one lives within its scope, while it is easy not to see the benefits of capitalism when one lives in the West.

The thesis about the exhaustion of society is not in the least bit conceived as an alibi or as a justification for it. Four times after the war Polish society moved itself and exploded, and a new explosion, in point of fact, is possible at any moment. Poles, therefore, need no alibi. What is needed, on the other hand, is understanding how difficult the moral and material situation is in which the great majority of society finds itself. An understanding of this at times dramatic situation of millions of families and people must lead one to be cautious in raising hasty accusations against the nation and to take into account the fact that, beyond certain boundaries is the basic prerequisite for activity by the opposition, and it ought also to be the prerequisite for the policy of the Party, if it desires to avoid a new misfortune in the country.

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# ALLIANCES OF RCP IN 1921-1933 PERIOD EXAMINED

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[Article by Mihai Fatu: "Concerning the Alliance Policy Promoted by the RCP in the 1921-1933 Period"]

[Text] The activity of the party of the working class in Romania for more than eight decades confirms through the power of examples the great importance that has gone to the promotion of an elastic tactic, suited to the sociopolitical circumstances of each historical epoch, with regard to the political parties and groups either having the same social base and common political goals or differing in their class nature, in the positions occupied in society and in their general interests.

The reaching of agreements or understandings on collaboration with other political parties or organizations in the struggle to develop the country in the direction of democracy and to protect the highest interests of the Romanian people has occupied a significant place in the strategy and tactics of the party of the working class in Romania, especially beginning in May 1921.

Utilizing the abundant experience of the working-class movement in Romania in the matter of alliances and devising a tactical line of its own, the Communist Party has asserted itself as a strong national political force, supporting the basic interests of the working masses, capable of polarizing all the advanced, progressive forces of the nation for the continual development of the country in the direction of multilateral progress.

The elaboration and promotion of the policy of alliances by the Communist Party was a complex process on which many internal and external factors acted. The anticommunist policy promoted by the reactionary circles of the exploiting classes, and the outlawing of the RCP in 1924, created many difficulties for the activity of the Communist Party among the masses and for the dissemination and discussion in public of its program and the social and economic problems of the development of Romania. To these were added many unrealistic instructions and theses imposed on the Romanian Communist Party by the Comintern, which negatively influenced the theoretical and practical activity of the RCP.



Starting with the period immediately after the congress in May 1921, the defining of the social and political contours, of the characteristics and directions of the evolution of the system of political parties in Romania after World War I, and, in this context, the establishment of its position, role and place in this system constituted one of the dominant concerns of the Romanian Communist Party. Objectively, these concerns were not able to be concretized immediately by means of the establishment of a tactical orientation suited to each political party that existed at that time in Romania. In the tradition of our working-class movement there existed the practice of thoroughly analyzing each aspect of the domestic situation and, all the more, those that were indirectly connected or were directly connected with the activity of the party of the working class. This explains why, a short time after the Congress in May 1921, in the central and local press published by the RCP there were discussions on the system of parties in Romania and on the situation, the character and the prospects of the evolution of each of its components, with a view to figuring out the potential coalition partners of the Communist Party. Clearly, under these circumstances, there were issued a number of opinions that helped the RCP leadership to adopt, after not much time, a realistic position toward the worker and nonworker political formations and, as a consequence, to obtain notable successes in the area of its political alliances. However, it must be pointed out that not all of the theses and judgments formulated then about political parties or formations proved later to be justified, but it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the discussions that took place in a democratic framework allowed the communists to define their position toward each of these parties, including in connection with the possibilities of reaching agreements on joint actions in different fields of the social and political life of the country.

Under the signature of Petre Constantinescu-Iasi, the newspaper SOCIALISM, the central press organ of the RCP in that period, published in February 1922 a series of articles under the title "The Political Parties and Communism" in which were analyzed the changes occurring during the first postwar years, the bonds and the differences of opinion that dominated the whole system and, in particular, the way in which the Communist Party was related to this political context.

This system, situated apart from the communists, was divided into two distinct groups. First, there were the Liberal, Progressive-Conservative, Democratic-Conservative, and People's parties, which represented the basic interests of the upper bourgeoisie and of the rest of the Romanian landowners as well as of those political circles that gravitated around them. In the view of the communists, these social and political forces, which were viewed only from the angle of the direct relations with the RCP, composed the anticommunist front, toward which the tactic of an open and relentless struggle had to be adopted. The Liberal Party was judged as being at the head of "the strongest enemies of communism," representing "the political organization of the Romanian capitalists," for which "the communist program represents an immediate and strong danger." The Progressive-Conservative and Democratic-Conservative parties were regarded as being descendants of the party of the big landowners, in which a group of lawyers, with Take Ionescu, the head of

the democratic conservatives, distinguishing himself among them, had also found themselves a place.<sup>2</sup>

Referring to the People's Party, it was felt that "it had collected many politicians coming from the Conservative and Democratic-Conservative parties..., found in a rapid process of dissolution," in whom "the ideologism and the profits of power awoke appetites that they expressed like true oligarchs."<sup>3</sup>

Reflecting on the angle from which these parties were viewed, it follows that, apart from the looming of their profile as political forces representing the interests of the ruling classes, certain new phenomena that had made their appearance in them, as an expression of the accomplishment of national state unity and, as a result of this situation, of the process of diversification of the options concerning the evolution of Romanian society by bourgeois-democratic means, were not also discerned, phenomena that created new possibilities of collaboration, in certain directions, between the communists and these parties, despite the clear class differences that separated them. The fact that the role of these political forces was viewed only from their anticommunist attitude, without also taking into account other traits and relating them to the big problems that stood before Romanian society then, was of a nature to lead to the issuance, a priori, of the hypothesis of the impossibility of any rapprochements and joint actions of the respective parties with the communists.

Of course, this conclusion must not be generalized to the whole of the RCP orientation, it being expressed only in the series published by the newspaper SOCIALISM.

In the second group were those forces that had a more nuanced attitude toward the Communist Party. In the opinion of SOCIALISM, the Peasant, Democratic-Nationalist (Iorga) and the Romanian National parties and the Federation of Socialist Parties belonged to this group. In defining the character of these parties and the relations between them and the Communist Party the attempt to analyze them with greater differentiation, but not to the point of defining a tactical line required by the realities of the epoch, stood out. The Peasant Party was judged as "the strongest of the bourgeois opposition."<sup>4</sup> Although its leadership cadre also came from the old parties of the bourgeoisie and the landowners--C. Stere, N. Lupu and St. Popescu from the liberals and S. Mehedinti from the conservatives--the social base was composed of peasants. It was felt that the Peasant Party expressed "predominantly the small peasant proprietorship," which "is being nourished while nourishing in its turn the peasant's instincts of individual ownership and the desire to lay hands on power in order to organize the state in conformity with his interests."<sup>5</sup> From this viewpoint, the author of the series, analyzing the relations between the two parties, observed, first, the elements that separated them. It was felt that the Peasant Party differed from the Communist Party in its political outlook and social base, but the conclusion was formulated incorrectly that this party and the peasantry, included within it, had two potential enemies of equal value, namely "exploitative individualism"

alongside which was "the exploited and communist proletariat."<sup>6</sup> Without ignoring the elements of unity between the two parties, resulting from their social base, the newspaper reduced the unity to "the common interest in the struggle against the capitalist oligarchy," meaning by this the industrial and banking upper bourgeoisie that dominated the economic and political life of the country. Even if the Peasant Party later took positions opposed to the Communist Party, this judgment harmed, to a degree, the relations between the two parties at a time when the National Peasant Party was expressing itself in a bourgeois-democratic way, sometimes with radical tendencies, and when it was possible to establish a united front of struggle against the main bourgeois political forces and for democratic changes favorable to the working masses. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that as far back as in this phase the communists discerned the existence of political bridges of a nature to bring them closer to the Peasant Party in the struggle against the banking and industrial upper bourgeoisie, a fact that facilitated many later efforts of the Communist Party to achieve a rapprochement with the Peasant and, afterward, with the National Peasant Party, resulting from its merger with the National Party in 1926.

The Democratic Nationalist Party (Iorga), having a heterogeneous social structure, provided in its economic program for protection of cottage industry and for individual ownership, a reason why--in the judgment of communist militant P. Constantinescu-Iasi--it was not able to understand the political goals of the communist movement. Nevertheless, he stated that many of those under the influence of this party had "sometimes a favorable attitude toward the communists," especially when they were alongside in the struggle against big capital, "the true enemy of both."<sup>8</sup>

The noting of rapprochements between the communists and some categories under the influence of Iorga's party gave proof of the effort of the communists to also find means of access to the petit-bourgeois social categories, even if the goals and directions of the activity of the political groups in which they were included were different from those of the RCP.

The Romanian National Party [PNR] was regarded as a representative of the social class with dominant positions in the economic, social and political life of the country, without it being seen that in it and under its influence were big masses of the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the Romanian petit bourgeoisie that made an important contribution to the achievement of the union of Transylvania with Romania and to the defense of the national rights of the Romanians in this part of the country.

Viewing it only from the angle of the anticommunist attitude of representatives of the Romanian bourgeoisie, the communists issued, a priori, a tactical orientation toward the PNR that was to dominate the relations between the two formations until the merger of the National Party with the Peasant Party in 1926. To this is also added the placement of the PNR on the same plane as the democratic nationalist parties and those belonging to the ethnic minority groups.<sup>9</sup>

Viewpoints in connection with the attitude that the RCP had to adopt toward the Federation of Socialist Parties in Romania (FPSR) were also expressed during the discussions in the communist press. The judgment was made that "between the social democrats and the communists there can be rapprochements,"<sup>10</sup> a fact that indicated the desire of the revolutionary militants that the working-class movement regain its political and organizational unity. It being felt, correctly, that at the basis of the FPSR's activity was Marxist ideology, some cadre of the Communist Party still did not really grasp the social composition of this organization, regarded as being composed only of "trade-union leaders and of some groups of supporters, especially from Transylvania and Bucovina."<sup>11</sup> In reality, the worker element, mainly from heavy industry and the extractive industry, to which were added artisans, functionaries and intellectuals, constituted the mass basis of the FPSR.

Analyzing the role and the position of the leadership of the socialist and social-democratic movement, the communist militants detected the existence of a group of leaders with reformist tendencies (I. Flueraș, I. Jumanca, E. Gherman, I. Ciser and so on) and of another group with merits in the dissemination of Marxism (George and Tatiana Grigorovici, Litman Ghelester and so on). Absolutizing and generalizing at the level of the whole socialist movement the tendencies of the first group, they felt wrongly that they represented "the strongest auxiliaries of the bourgeoisie," "which put themselves at the head of the enemies of the proletariat," having a "bourgeois mentality."<sup>12</sup>

Under the circumstances when these discussions for defining the position toward the political parties and groups existing in Romania at that time were occurring within the RCP, general parliamentary elections, an occasion for practical verification of the orientations outlined up to then, took place in March 1922.

Many actions for bringing about the unity of all the revolutionary, democratic forces aiming at the defeat of the Liberal Party and, implicitly, its removal from the government of the country were undertaken during the electoral campaign in February-March 1922 that preceded the elections.<sup>13</sup> The main attention, from this viewpoint, was concentrated on the achievement of the unity of action of the communists, the socialists and the social democrats and on the achievement of collaboration with the Peasant Party. In this regard, the Communist Party proposed to the Federation of Socialist Parties participation in the elections on single lists. Although this tactical formula of electoral collaboration was not carried out at the level of the entire country because of the refusal of socialist and social-democratic leaders, in some localities, such as Ploiesti, Iasi, Galati and Constanta, single lists were turned in by the communists, the socialists and the social democrats.<sup>14</sup> The communists also made a similar attempt with the Peasant Party, but without it being able to be materialized in any concrete electoral action.<sup>15</sup> In fact, in this electoral campaign the use of the possibilities of legal political activity to consolidate the ranks of the Communist Party, to bring it to the masses, and to propagate its own programmatic ideas

constituted the basic objective of the communists. The RCP Executive Committee's report to the second party congress, in October 1922, specified that "the intention of removing the deputies did not enter for a moment" into the tactic advocated by the Communists for the elections in 1922. The party's tactic--as it was noted in the cited document--was the following: "to profit from the relative freedom that the elections gave us in the cities to present ourselves to the masses, to explain to them the necessity of the legal existence of our party, and to start the first organizations that, throughout the campaign, had to proceed to the work of centralization"--of achieving a united and unified organizational structure throughout the country.

Participating in the electoral campaign and the elections, the Communist Party organized big demonstrations in which large masses from the urban areas took part. Sweeping actions along the line of reaching electoral political agreements that would put the party among the parliamentary political groups were not achieved. In fact, under the conditions in which the party was in full swing in organizing its own ranks, when the anticommunist process was occurring in Dealul Spirii, when, despite the electoral freedoms provided by law, the liberals, in power, took steps to impede the legal activity of the communists and when the party's program and its tactic regarding the big problems of Romania were in an incipient phase of appearance, it was explainable that extensive results along the line of its policy of alliances were not achieved during the elections in 1922. Nevertheless, the RCP's participation in the general parliamentary elections in March 1922 constituted a useful experience, which was to be taken into account in the later electoral confrontations, and, what was even more important, this participation meant, in fact, recognition of its legal activity by the authorities.

The experience of these first actions of penetration into political life was to furnish the communists some conclusions, especially along the line of the possibility of getting closer to the Peasant Party and of the necessity of achieving the united workers front. On 25 November 1923, the RCP Central Committee addressed to the Peasant Party a proposal of collaboration within a coalition of political forces called "the Worker and Peasant Bloc" for the struggle against the liberal government. Many contacts for collaboration between the Communists and the Peasant Party with a view to fulfilling desires common to both parties were established during this year, it happening that members of the Communist Party were invited to assemblies of the Peasant Party in order to formulate and argue their viewpoints in connection with the necessity of combined action against the liberals. Regardless of the fact that the leaders of the Peasant Party, through their collaboration with the communists in the struggle against the Liberal Party, pursued certain petty political goals, and the communists had as a goal the unification of the energies of the two parties for the struggle against the bourgeoisie, in general, and the upper bourgeoisie, in particular, grouped especially in the Liberal Party, these first contacts for joint action between the communists and the Peasant Party offered the Communist Party a valuable political guide in discerning the means of penetration into such political formations.

On 12 March 1924, the Central Committee of the Communist Party addressed to the Executive Committee of the Peasant Party a letter in which the proposal of creating a worker and peasant bloc was repeated, a document that pointed out, once again, the way in which the Communist Party conceived the achievement of wide openings toward political forces which were nonproletarian but which, by means of their social and programmatic base, were in positions close to the working class and the Communist Party. The letter started, in the main, from the viewpoint that the Peasant Party "recognizes both in the Liberal Party and the other bourgeois parties the representatives of classes with which the peasantry and the workers, whom your party declares that it supports, are struggling. Your party declared that it recognizes this class struggle and that it realizes that this struggle is the only means by which an oppressed class gains its rights."<sup>16</sup> Although the Peasant Party exhibited inconstancy in the attitude toward other opposition bourgeois political forces, and reservations toward an alliance with the communists, the RCP felt that there were more affinities between the Communist Party and the Peasant Party than between the Peasant Party and any other party. Starting from these premises and from the concern for achieving the worker and peasant alliance, the Communist Party proposed to the Peasant Party "the formation of a united front of the workers parties in the cities and the villages for overthrowing the government of the upper bourgeoisie and for establishing a worker and peasant government."<sup>17</sup>

These efforts of the communists were not materialized then, the causes being many. In our opinion, three of them were decisive: first, it was a question of the growth, within the Peasant Party, of the influence of the leaders supporting the creation of a "bloc of the opposition," without the communists, composed of the bourgeois parties which were opposed to the liberals and which did not want to address themselves to the working and peasant masses and the political forces that they represented, in order to not disturb the existing social and political composition; second, in the spring of 1924 a deterioration of the relations between the Peasant Party and the communists, as moreover between the communists and other national political forces, occurred in connection with the different position adopted toward the object of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations in Vienna; third, the outlawing of the Communist Party in 1924 increased the differences of opinion between the communists and the Peasant Party, putting the Communist Party in another legal and political situation with regard to the Peasant Party and with regard to other bourgeois-democratic political forces engaged in the effort to "perfect" the existing sociopolitical system, while still keeping intact its economic and sociopolitical bases.

Beginning with the summer of 1924, certain reorientations, which would be of a nature to hinder, after this date, the rapprochement between the two political formations, were produced in connection with the tactic of the Communist Party with regard to the Peasant Party.

Thus, some documents drawn up during this period asked the communists to orient themselves toward the "leftwing" of this party, which had to be "supported

in order to be able to gain the party leadership," the existing leadership being termed "traitorous," especially as a result of the talks on merger held with the National Party. In the situation in which the Peasant Party was not divided into "leftwing" or "rightwing" groups and when this "leftwing" was asked to disseminate within its own party slogans foreign to the aspirations of the Romanian people, such as self-determination to the point of the separation of the so-called "annexed, conquered provinces" from the state, slogans imposed from outside the country, this orientation limited the Communist Party's possibilities of holding direct talks with the leadership of the Peasant Party with a view to the achievement of joint actions from party to party and from organization to organization. Such an evolution of the relations between the two parties were due not only to the tactical orientation of the communists but also to the refractory attitude of leaders of the Peasant Party who did not consider the initiatives of the communists in the area of collaboration between the two parties, to which was also added the growth of the influence of leaders of the same political formation who declared themselves to be for the merger with the National Party.

The Communist Party's tactic with regard to the political parties was not limited only to the relations with the Peasant Party. In this context, the tactical idea of "factions," which made itself a place with greater and greater insistence in the documents of the RCP, had in view the increasing of the party's influence and the implementation of its policy within each of these political formations. The communists formed into "factions" had the obligation to support, to take "stands in a collective and disciplined manner and to vote as a unit" in all the sessions or assemblies of the respective organizations.

The idea of organizing and leading the political activity of the communists who worked in different organizations with mass support, having as an objective the promotion of the policy of the Communist Party within them, resulted from the necessity of finding organizational and political forms for more closely connecting the party with the masses. However, the way in which the "tactic of factions" was conceived and materialized did not lead to the anticipated results. On the contrary, it negatively influenced precisely this effort of the communists to connect itself with the masses and to lead them. The idea of "a faction" nourished the phenomenon of isolation, of sectarianism in the relations between the communists and the mass of the respective organizations, a situation also determined by their effort to transplant into such organizations slogans, methods and forms of action specific to the RCP. The tactic of "factions" limited and narrowed the means of access of the communists to the masses and the possibilities of involving them in the solution of their specific problems and of achieving a rapprochement of the communists with the respective masses.

Apart from the theory and practice of "factions," the Communist Party's policy of alliances was also to be influenced negatively, for a time, as a result of other general orientations of a tactical order, established by documents drawn up in the following years, which markedly reflected the views of the

Communist International. On the Romanian Communist Party were imposed theses and judgments not consonant with the Romanian historical realities, which reduced the influence of the communists among significant sociopolitical categories that, objectively, could constitute important reserves of the Communist Party and the working class in the struggle for the general progress of the country against the reactionary forces.

Thus, there was issued the false thesis according to which Romania, after the achievement of the formation of the united national state in 1918, became, allegedly, a "multinational" state. Hence the task imposed on the Communist Party of supporting "the efforts of the oppressed nationalities" for the so-called resolution of the national problem "on the basis of the principle of the right to self-determination of the nations to the point of complete separation from the existing state." The peasant problem, especially in the so-called "annexed" regions, was artificially connected with the "resolution" of this so-called "national problem."<sup>18</sup> The RCP was harshly criticized several times for the fact that it did not militate for the implementation of the slogan of the Communist International on this matter.<sup>19</sup>

Such a solution to complex problems of Romanian society, which had to become "the keystone of the attitude of the party," negatively influenced its real possibilities of penetrating into the masses. To this was added the worsening of the relations between the communists, the socialists and the social democrats due both to the sectarian attitude and the incorrect judgment of the character of the socialist and social-democratic movement, formulated by the communists, and to opportunistic attitudes manifested within the Federation of Socialist Parties.

Despite the indicated difficulties and shortcomings, the communists remained faithful to the idea of finding and using all the possibilities to attract the broad masses of people to the united struggle and to achieve democratic, revolutionary changes. These efforts were materialized in the creation, on the basis of the decisions of the plenum of the RCP Central Committee in July 1925, of the Worker and Peasant Bloc, conceived as a legal political organization of wide scope to which communists, socialists, social democrats and members of the Peasant Party and of other democratic political parties and groups were to belong. The first organizational measures along the line of the establishment of this organization began in the fall of 1925 along with the creation, on the initiative of the Communist Party, of an action committee of the Bloc of Worker and Peasant Democracy (BDMT), composed of members of the unit trade unions and of representatives of the working masses not organized politically or professionally.<sup>20</sup> On 18 April 1926, the Conference of the Action Committees of the BDMT, in Turnu Severin, elected a central committee of this organization, which was to adopt, later, the title of the Worker and Peasant Bloc (BMT).<sup>21</sup>

Although it was called a "bloc," the BMT did not actually constitute a political organization which included in it independent parties and organizations, with programs of their own that turned up in a common political platform, and



in which each one preserved its individuality. From this viewpoint, even if it was not a political organization, the BMT represented an original way of materializing the Communist Party's policy of alliances for expanding its connections with the working masses and for organizing and leading them in a united manner on the basis of a common program of action. The BMT played an important role in the promotion of the RCP's policy of alliances in a period when, because of the difficulties encountered as a result of the outlawing of the Communist Party, the possibilities of the communists of addressing themselves openly to the masses were greatly narrowed. This role appeared right in the process of organizing the BMT, through its affirmation in Romanian political life on wider planes on the occasion of the communal and general parliamentary elections in 1926. Thus, for the communal elections in February 1926, the action committees of the BMT reached agreements with local organizations of the Federation of Socialist Parties and of the National Peasant Party and with organizations of the People's Party, the latter grouped into a political organization known under the name of the "united opposition." The importance of this experience is not related to the fact that the BMT managed to obtain 27 mandates of communal councillors in Bucharest, Oradea, Timisoara, Arad and so on--a number that, in fact, did not express its real force--but especially to the existence of possibilities of joint actions being achieved among political organizations not homogeneous from a social viewpoint, even if the motive for this unity consisted only in the removal of the liberal government. The positive element of this experience must also be related to the possibility that had been created for the communists, the socialists and other representatives of the working masses of using this political campaign, or any other similar occasions, to go among the masses and openly popularize their own program.

However, the significance of these conclusions was noticeably blurred and, to a great extent, annihilated as a result of the criticism formulated by the Executive Committee of the Communist International about the tactical orientation of the BMT in the communal elections at the start of 1926. In the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International about the activity of the RCP, published in LUPTA DE CLASE in June 1926, in reference to the BMT's tactic promoted during the communal elections, it said: "The party" (the Communist Party--our note) "did very well when it hailed<sup>22</sup> the formation of the Bloc of Worker and Peasant Democracy. However, it was an error when it extended its tactic of the united front to all the parties that opposed the liberal government, with their purely bourgeois character being overlooked,...it /was the most serious political error, which deserves the most severe condemnation/" */in italics/* (our italics). The National Party and Averescu's party are cited in the document as examples of forces with which the united front should not be achieved. In order to "correct" this tactical orientation, judged as being incorrect, the cited document asked of the Communist Party that in the future the tactic of the united front be applied "completely with regard to two parties--the Social-Democratic and Peasant parties--on the basis of an absolutely concrete platform that unites the great working masses. The fact that peasant masses also follow the bourgeois parties does not mean that a united front can be made with

them. Regarding the parties of the national minorities, the tactic of the united front can be applied with regard to them only because they bring with them to a predominant degree peasant and petit-bourgeois masses...."<sup>23</sup>

From the cited text, and from the general context of this document, there stand out a few findings that attest to the nonrealism, the incorrect character of the criticisms and of the recommendations of the Comintern in reference to the matter under discussion. First, not only the National Party and Averescu's party but also the Peasant Party had a bourgeois character. From this viewpoint, at that time, between the three parties--the Peasant, National and "People's" parties--there was no essential difference from the viewpoint of their social base. In each of them were, in general, representatives of the same social categories: the city and village petit bourgeoisie, masses of the peasantry, functionaries, and so on.

The judging of the National Party and Averescu's party as being "purely bourgeois" and of the Peasant Party as not having this trait produced confusion among the communists in connection with understanding the similarities and the differences between the nonproletarian parties and the bourgeois-democratic ones in which working masses, especially the peasantry, were also found and the differences between them with regard to their goals, programs and social base. In the same issue of the journal LUPTA DE CLASA the character and the mass base of the National Party were judged as follows: "The National Party is an outright bourgeois, capitalist party (even if it is followed in Transylvania by peasant masses)"; "The National Party has entered a process of decomposition: the capitalist groups have begun to break away from it and to move openly into the united front of the oligarchy, the National Party thus becoming more and more the party of the petit and middle bourgeoisie in Transylvania. With such a party of the petit and middle bourgeoisie as the National Party in Transylvania would become after its complete and radical cleansing of all the capitalist elements, the workers and the peasantry could meet in its struggle against the dominant feudal and banking oligarchy, along a parallel line--the parallel struggle not meaning at all, however, the struggle in a united front."<sup>24</sup> If, in truth, such changes occurred in the National Party, it means that the differences between it and the Peasant Party became diluted, moving toward a merger, as things occurred in reality right in the summer of 1926--hence the conclusion that the BMT's tactic with regard to this party, which began to no longer be "purely bourgeois," was correct, to the extent to which the alliance with the Peasant Party was correct. The conclusion according to which collaboration would be achievable only with "those mass parties which present themselves as class parties, which claim to be class parties of the workers or of the peasantry and which, consequently, are followed by working and peasant masses"--the Communist, Social-Democratic and Peasant parties--formulated in the same context by LUPTA DE CLASA, was of a nature to narrow the means of penetration, the wide openings tried earlier and with much success by the communists toward other social forces than those of the workers and the peasants and toward other political formations than those of the workers.

Correlating the tactical experience accumulated by the RCP prior to 1924, and especially that accumulated during the communal elections in 1926, with the critical observations formulated by the Comintern about the policy of the Communist Party during the above-mentioned elections and especially with the tactic that was indicated to it, it can be stated that, beginning with the elections for the chamber of deputies and the senate in May 1926, a reduction of the practical achievements was registered in the area of political alliances.

For the new consultation of the electoral body, the Communist Party indicated the following tactical solution: "the proletarian organizations must propose to the Peasant Party to enter these elections together, in a united workers and peasants front that would not also include the National Party.... They" (the proletarian organizations--our note) "must address themselves to the members of the Peasant Party and penetrate into the peasantry in order to prove to them with facts why /the National Party must be isolated/" *[in italics]* (our italics) "and why the Peasant Party must align itself only with the organizations of the workers in the cities." In this regard, the Communist Party pledged that it "will decisively support all the elements and organizations in the Peasant Party that, instead of further looking longingly upward, will look down, will direct themselves toward the masses, organizing them and inspiring them in the struggle for the demands of the working people, for the overthrow of the liberals...."<sup>25</sup>

Consequently, the worker political forces were to direct their main efforts to win over the peasant masses toward the Peasant Party, isolating the National Party for the removal of the liberals from power. This is why the communists had to support any organizations or elements in the Peasant Party, which, in their turn, did not follow the leadership of the party but oriented themselves especially toward the lower masses. Setting aside the fact that the sphere of the political forces, in which peasant masses really existed, narrowed, from the cited text there results a note of sectarianism, of an attempt to implement the practice of "factions," with a view to supporting the "leftwing" of the Peasant Party.

In our opinion, the renunciation by the communists of the effort to attract the Peasant Party, in its entirety, for joint participation in the parliamentary elections reduced even more the real chances of the communists of achieving this front. At the same time, one nevertheless notes the orientation toward the achievement of a political agreement between the BMT and the Federation of Socialist Parties and between the BMT and other political or professional organizations that included the city masses.

Ultimately, however, not one of these tactical slogans was materialized and the BMT did not manage to finalize any agreement on collaboration, either with the Peasant Party<sup>26</sup> or with the Federation of Socialist Parties.<sup>27</sup> The non-fulfillment of this important desire of the communists cannot be explained only by means of the deficiencies of the tactic of the RCP in the matter of political alliances. This evolution of the events was also determined to a

great extent by the obstructionistic character of the policy of the leaders of the Peasant Party and of social democrats with regard to the proposals of the BMT.

Obviously, we do not view only from a negative angle, one of failures, the significance of these elections, from the viewpoint of the general effort made by the Communist Party to achieve the unity of action of all the advanced, progressive forces. The truth is that this general effort of the communists registered another important gain in the general process of political growth and ideological tempering of the party, of accumulation of valuable experience that was to be successfully utilized later. The use of the freedoms offered by the electoral campaign for propagation, by means required by the new situation of the party, as an illegal party, constituted an important step in the direction of connecting it with the masses and of knowing, of figuring out more realistically the possibilities of attracting different nonproletarian political organizations and parties into joint actions with the worker and peasant forces for bringing about economic and sociopolitical changes and of establishing the programmatic framework required by the realities of the epoch that would be the basis of the joint actions. However, this was to be a historical process that was to appear later without being exempt from some shortcomings that would put their imprint not only on the policy of alliances promoted by the party but also on the entire working-class and communist movement in Romania.

However, it must be noted that, in the analyzed field, the Communist Party would no longer promote during the 1927-1931 period slogans in the area of political alliances similar to those up to and during the elections in 1926. In the elections in 1926 and 1931 the Communist Party limited itself to using the Worker and Peasant Bloc as a political organization for asserting itself, by legal means, in political life, there being abandoned the idea of joint actions with the National Peasant Party [PNT] or with the social democrats.

Such an evolution of the events helped to increase the confusion and the mistakes of a tactical order that found themselves a place in the life of the Romanian Communist Party as a result of the imposition by the Comintern of unrealistic theses and judgments concerning the evolution of sociopolitical processes in Romania. The RCP's documents during this period, drawn up outside the country and imposed on it, strikingly reflected the fact that the nonrecognition of the Romanian realities led to the adoption of decisions, theses and orientations that were to put their imprint in a negative fashion not only on the Communist Party's policy of alliances but also on its general activity as a revolutionary political party.

In this regard, unrealistic judgments were made about worker and bourgeois-democratic political parties and organizations. Thus, the leadership of the PNT, in its entirety, was regarded as being traitorous and the party, in its entirety, as sliding toward "inevitable decomposition." In this context, there was formulated the task that the RCP, in the struggle to win over the peasant masses, do everything to "sever" these masses from "the traitorous

leadership, creating a leftwing that will be capable of waging to the end the struggle in union with the working class for their claims against the land-owners and the capitalists."<sup>28</sup> The reality was that, during the 1927-1928 period, the PNT was in an obvious process of consolidating both its own ranks and its influence with the masses and that there could be no question of an imminent "collapse" or of a real prospect of creating within it a leftwing capable of severing the masses from the leaders and of bringing them alongside the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle. This view was added to other similar ones that deprived the Communist Party of the possibility of truly judging the situation in this party and of defining its tactic with regard to it in conformity with this reality. The National Peasant Party, being in a period of ascension in political life and having large masses under its political influence, could constitute an ally, although a temporary and unreliable but potential one, in the struggle of the communists to attract the masses into actions for democratic changes.

This tactic and the misstatements about the social democrats called "agents" of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement, without any attempt to separate the rightwing, opportunistic elements from those that had a generally positive attitude in the class struggles of the working masses and declared themselves to be for the restoration of the unity of the working-class movement, constituted factors that burdened the mass policy promoted by the Communist Party in a period when the social contradictions were increasing. Ultimately, the revival in a much more marked manner of the theses concerning the "imperialist character" of the Romanian state constituted, allegedly, by means of the conquest of foreign territories and the connection with the slogan of self-determination had negative repercussions on the RCP's policy of alliances.

From this time, the initiatives to depart from such rigid coordinates were vehemently criticized by forums of the Comintern and regarded as serious violations of the political line indicated to the party. LUPTA DE CLASA, under the influence of these orientations, criticized the fact that "attempts to conclude a coalition with the 'leftwing' social democrats and even with the National Peasant Party appeared in the Worker and Peasant Bloc."<sup>29</sup> Formulating the tactical tasks that resulted from these "errors" of the communists, the central theoretical organ of the RCP drew attention to the necessity that, in the case of the National Peasant Party, the attack be directed against "the leftwing leaders"--Ion Mihalache and Constantin Stere--who had become "an obstacle" in the way of the communists for winning over the peasantry "and for forming the alliance between the workers and the peasants."<sup>30</sup> Consequently, the same "leftwing" which once was in the Peasant Party and now was in the National Peasant Party and which, during the 1923-1926 period, constituted the main political force that had to be attracted into the coalition of the worker and peasant forces had become after 3 years the main enemy against which it was necessary to direct the blow for attracting the peasantry into an alliance with the proletariat, under the leadership of the Communist Party. Starting from such viewpoints, which, in fact, would be revived, the possibilities of a rapprochement and of collaboration with the PNT had moved away from the tactical objective of the Communist Party. A similar

position was also adopted with regard to the social democrats and the independent socialists. It followed that these parties, which were regarded earlier by the communists as representing the working masses, disappeared from the agenda of the presumptive allied forces of the communists in joint actions for certain changes, even bourgeois-democratic ones.

The Fifth RCP Congress, reviving other concerns existing within the Communist Party, defined the historical stage in which Romania was and the disposition of the political class forces in Romanian society, stressed the role of the proletariat as a crucial social force in the struggle to achieve the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the worker alliance, instructed the party to turn its attention toward the basic detachment of the proletariat, and so on.

The congress correctly defined the fact that the most important strategic task of the party was the forging of the alliance of struggle of the workers and the peasants under the hegemony of the proletariat. However, the recommended tactical orientation for attaining this objective was not of a nature to serve its fulfillment. In this regard, the congress established that in the struggle for leadership of the proletariat the main blow was to be oriented against the so-called "social fascism" and, in particular, "against the so-called 'leftwing'" in the PNT. At the same time, the documents adopted by the congress pointed out that, in order to win over and lead the peasant masses, "the main attack of the party is to be directed, above all, against the National Peasant Party, as the strongest and most dangerous enemy in the country, and especially against the so-called leftwing (the supporters of Stere and Lupu) and against the fascist organizations (Suza's supporters and the Iron Guards)...." The rejection of collaboration with the socialist and social-democratic organizations or with bourgeois-democratic formations, under the influence of which were large masses of working people, narrowed the Communist Party's framework for manifestation, not allowing it to utilize the real reserves of the Romanian nation in order to fulfill the tasks required by the objective necessities of the historical process, correctly defined by the congress. The placement of the social democrats and the National Peasant Party on the same plane as the fascist organizations--Cuza's supporters and the Iron Guard--was of a nature to create confusion among the masses in connection with the essence of fascism and the difference between it and social democracy, on the one hand, and the bourgeois-democratic political forces, on the other. However, rejecting collaboration with the bourgeois-democratic and workers parties, the congress instructed the communist militants to act to achieve the United Workers Front. The recommended tactic was the "lower" united front, without holding talks with the leadership of the social democratic or independent socialist organizations. The deficiency of such tactical orientations regarding the achievement of the unity of struggle of the working masses results especially from the fact that, as experience demonstrated, the united front with organizations or masses under the political influence of organizations or parties was not practically possible without the agreement of the leaders of those organizations. No matter how many divergences there may have been between those masses or a part of them and their leaders, there still were elements of unity between them and the leaders, which, as a matter of fact, constituted the *raison d'être* of

these political formations. Experience had demonstrated that "the communist factions" and "the Red opposition" in different political and professional organizations and especially in the trade unions had not succeeded in drawing after them the masses in those organizations to an extent to cause an abrupt turning of them toward the leftwing.

It is the historical merit of our communist party that, immediately after the fifth congress, in the process of the efforts to implement the instructions, correct ones for the most part, of the congress with regard to the necessity of more closely connecting the party with the masses, it found in its own ranks the force, the political and theoretical capacity and the creative energy that allowed it to overcome such shortcomings, to formulate the conclusions that resulted from the earlier experience, and to also place, for many years, the party's tactic in the matter of political alliances on new bases, required by the concrete historical realities of Romania.

The year 1932 and especially the start of the next one were to bring a decisive change in the party's general activity. The revolutionary struggles of the Romanian proletariat in 1933 and especially the great battles of the oil and railroad workers in January-February 1933 were to constitute a strong school of education for the working class, for other nonproletarian working masses and especially for the communists. The great social battles at the start of 1933 constituted the first great uprisings of the proletariat in Europe after the establishment of the Hitlerian dictatorship in Germany. In the ensuing period, the Communist Party performed a vast political activity for defining its political line and the forms and methods of struggle necessary to rally around the working class, on a common platform, all the patriotic, democratic forces involved in defending the country from the fascist peril. It is a remarkable merit of the Romanian Communist Party not only that it discerned right from the start the danger that hovered over Romania from Nazi Germany but also that it understood the truth that the supreme commandments of the Romanian people against fascism could be fulfilled only by involving all the antifascist and democratic social and political forces in this action and by achieving collaboration with different political and public organizations, on a common platform that looked to the defense of the independence, integrity and national being of Romania.

The wide opening toward the most different social and political categories and public organizations and the achievement of a wide front of struggle of all the national antifascist forces found their expression in countless political actions performed jointly by the communists, the socialists, the social democrats and the National Peasant Party against fascism and the war in ensuing years. The general political line promoted by the Romanian Communist Party with regard to achieving a wide front that involved all the national, democratic forces in defending the supreme interests of Romania from the fascist peril began to come to life right from the first manifestations of the antifascist struggle in Romania. The experience accumulated in this phase was to be utilized on higher planes in ensuing years, in the effort to achieve the Antifascist People's Front, the national united front of struggle against the Antonescu regime and the Hitlerian occupation and war. The

antifascist and anti-imperialist armed national insurrection in August 1944, a crucial moment in the millenary history of the Romanian people in their struggle for social and national emancipation, for progress, for socialism and communism, constituted an initial and decisive materialization of this policy of wide opening toward all the advanced forces of the Romanian nation.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. SOCIALISM, Yr XVII, No 103, 11 February 1922.
2. Ibid., No 107, 16 February 1922.
3. Ibid., No 109, 18 February 1922.
4. SOCIALISM, Yr XVII, No 112, 22 February 1922.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. SOCIALISM, Yr XVII, No 113, 23 February 1922.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., No 114, 24 February 1922.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Cf.: Nicolae Petreanu, "The Romanian Communist Party in the Political Life of Romania in the 1921-1933 Period. Moments and Significances," ANALE DE ISTORIE, Yr XVIII, No 4, 1972, pp 70-94; Florian Tanasescu, "The Romanian Communist Party in the Parliamentary Elections in 1922-1938," ANALE DE ISTORIE, Yr XIX, No 2, 1973, pp 91-110; and Mihai Rusenescu, "The Relations of the Romanian Communist Party With Other Parties in the 1922-1928 Period," STUDII. REVISTA DE ISTORIE, Vol 2/1975 (No 2), pp 985-1009.
14. N. Petreanu, op. cit., p 71.
15. M. Rusenescu, op. cit., p 897.
16. These judgments and convictions of the communists about the members of the Peasant Party occurred in that phase of the process of growth and affirmation of the Peasant Party in political life when the theories of the members of the Peasant Party about the classes and the class



struggles had not yet been invalidated by reality, when the Peasant Party was in the phase prior to the merger with the National Party, a merger as a result of which such theses were abandoned both in theory and especially in concrete political practice.

17. "Documente din Istoria Miscarii Muncitoresti si Revolutionare din Romania, 1921-1924" [Documents From the History of the Working-Class and Revolutionary Movement in Romania, 1921-1924], Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1970, p 678.
18. The Archives of the Institute of Historical and Sociopolitical Studies within the RCP Central Committee (further: the Archives of the ISISP [Institute of Historical and Sociopolitical Studies]), call number A VIII-3, inventory number 126.
19. Ibid.
20. See: "Organizatii de Masa Legale si Ilegale Create, Conduse sau Influentate de PCR, 1921-1944" [Legal and Illegal Mass Organizations Created, Led or Influenced by the RCP, 1921-1944], Vol I, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1970, p 260.
21. Ibidem, p 264.
22. The RCP did not confine itself to "hailing" the creation of the BMT but was the initiator and political force that guided its entire activity.
23. LUPA DE CLASE, No 1, June 1926.
24. Ibid.
25. LUPA DE CLASA, No 1, June 1926.
26. The BMT also made a proposal of collaboration in these elections to the National Party, but the latter rejected it. (Ioan Scurtu, "Din Viata Politica a Romaniei, 1918-1926" [From the Political Life of Romania, 1918-1926], "Litera" Publishing House, Bucharest, 1975, p 168.)
27. Cf.: Nicolae Petreanu, op. cit., p 81; "Organizatii de Masa Legale si Ilegale...", pp 267-268; and M. Rusenescu, op. cit., pp 1002-1003.
28. The Archives of the ISISP, call number A XII-1, inventory number 240.
29. LUPA DE CLASA, Nos 10-11, 1929, p 3.
30. Ibid., p 8.

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SLOVENIAN SAWP DISCUSSES PRESS FINANCING

Ljubljana DELO in Slovenian 14 Jul 78 p 2

[Article by Anton Repnik]

[Text] Ljubljana, 13 July--Today, after the main discussions at the Executive Committee and the Press Council, the Presidium of the Slovenian Republic Conference of the SAWP also was apprised of the unsolved burning problem of financing the daily political informational press in Slovenia (DELO, DNEVNIK, and VECER). The presidency sent a proposal for a social agreement on price setting interconnections between sociopolitical communities, the sponsoring organizations of the daily newspapers, and the basic organizations of associated labor involved in the production of daily newspapers for discussion and signing.

The Presidium of the Republic Conference of the SAWP noted in this case that it is necessary at the same time to prepare self-management agreements on the production and distribution of dailies, on obtaining joint income, as well as on the assumption of risks. In general, in the opinion of the presidium, it would be necessary to hold principled discussions on how the integration process is proceeding in this area, and how the sponsoring organizations coordinate the production, personnel, and other resources and on other vital questions in connection with the role of political information in our society.

In the introductory report, member of the presidency Lenart Setinc emphasized that there continues to be an excessive gap between the principled evaluations of sociopolitical officials on the importance of the political information press and on the solutions for financing it. All solutions thus far have turned out to be haphazard. A social agreement supplemented by suitable self-managed agreements should overcome the current unsatisfactory state of affairs. All sociopolitical agencies must share the responsibility for the material condition and the prices of dailies, noted Setinc.

The discussions presided over by Beno Zupancic were attended by Vlado Beznik, Jak Koprivc, Tomo Martelanc, Tina Tomlja, Edo Klanjsek, Stane Gavez, Dusan Sinigoj, and Vladimir Klemencic. They showed that in Slovenia we do not have a well-defined system of financing the political information press and because of chronic material problems, the editorial finds it difficult to cope with all of the most desirable tasks involved in the introduction of new specific forms of information in a self-management system. All of this requires a

quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the editorial boards--the unsolved questions of financing limit them however. The difficulties are of course also objective, since in Slovenia we have a relatively very small language-speaking area (and a rather high level of publishing in this area); the political press however, also has to be subsidized everywhere in the world.

The Presidium of the Republic Conference of the SAWP decided to set up a problem-solving conference on the position of women employees in associated labor. They will schedule it for December, since it will be discussed on the obcina level beforehand.

CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

NEW DELO STAFF MEMBERS---Today, Slavko Beznik, hitherto deputy chief editor of the DELO Newspaper and Publishing Enterprise was named chief editor by the Presidium of the Slovenian Republic Conference of SAWP. Boris Dolnicar, hitherto deputy chief of the domestic politics sections, was appointed as the new responsible editor of DELO. At the same time, the presidium gave its consent to the selection of Antej Mahkota, hitherto acting director of the Basic Organization of Associated Labor of the newspaper DELO, as chief director of the DELO Newspaper and Publishing Enterprise, and of Niko Kodelet as his deputy chief editor. The SAWP Republic Conference Presidium decided to give a written commendation to the outgoing responsible editor of DELO Slavko Fras for his many years of fruitful labor. Fras has completed his term and will accept a new position. A commendation will also be given to outgoing chief director Niko Belopavlovic and Janez Ovsenik, director of the "Grafika" Basic Organization of Associated Labor, who will be retiring. [Text] [Ljubljana DELO in Slovenian 14 Jul 178 p 2]

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